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Reconceptualizing the Fifth Amendment 
Prohibition of Adverse Comment on Criminal 
Defendants’ Trial Silence 
JEFFREY BELLIN
Griffin v. California holds that the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination prohibits a prosecutor from arguing that a 
defendant’s failure to testify supports an inference of guilt. In the four 
decades since Griffin was decided, Griffin’s doctrinal underpinnings have 
been strongly criticized by prominent jurists and commentators, and even 
Griffin’s contemporary defenders struggle to place the constitutional 
prohibition of adverse comment on defendant silence within a coherent 
doctrinal framework. 
In light of these largely unanswered criticisms, this Article posits that 
the current Fifth Amendment-based prohibition of adverse comment is 
untenable and must be recast in a more narrowly tailored form. Relying on 
a fairness rationale implicit in existing case law, this Article constructs a 
limited Fifth Amendment prohibition of adverse comment on defendant trial 
silence and suggests a mechanism by which this tailored constitutional 
prohibition could be implemented. 
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INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment commands that no person “shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”1 Loosely characterized as 
the privilege against self-incrimination, this constitutional right has, of 
necessity, continually evolved to keep pace with an ever-changing American 
criminal justice system.2 Not surprisingly, each evolution has been 
accompanied by controversy.3
1 U.S. CONST. amend V. 
2 See Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right 
to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625, 2660 (1996) (describing how the 
“[l]awyerization” of criminal trials in the nineteenth century led “to a changed ideology 
of criminal procedure—one in which the dignity of defendants lay not in their ability to 
tell their stories fully, but rather in their ability to remain passive”); Akhil Reed Amar & 
Renée B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 
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A particularly contentious innovation in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence 
arose in the 1965 case of Griffin v. California, where the Supreme Court held 
that the privilege against self-incrimination prohibits a prosecutor from 
arguing that a defendant’s failure to testify supports an inference of guilt.4
Despite enduring controversy, this landmark constitutional decision has 
become “an essential feature of our legal tradition,”5 strictly limiting jury 
argument and instruction in state and federal criminal trials.6 Decades after 
MICH. L. REV. 857, 859–60 (1995) (highlighting the “enormous amount of modern 
criminal law enforcement [that] has been shaped by the Self-Incrimination Clause, as 
(mis)construed over the years”); John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1084 
(1994) (“[a]cross the centuries the privilege against self-incrimination has changed 
character profoundly”); see also infra Part I. 
3 Amar & Lettow, supra note 2, at 858 (contending that “[t]he Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment is currently in a jumbled transitional phase” and 
that the privilege “continues to confound and confuse”); Michael Steven Green, The 
Paradox of Auxiliary Rights: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination and the Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms, 52 DUKE L.J. 113, 133–34 (2002) (arguing that Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence is “universally recognized to be a hopeless muddle” and contending that 
“judicial attempts to determine [the amendment’s] scope in a principled fashion cannot 
succeed”); John Fabian Witt, Making the Fifth: The Constitutionalization of American 
Self-Incrimination Doctrine, 1791–1903, 77 TEX. L. REV. 825, 908 (1999) (“[S]elf-
incrimination doctrine is . . . characterized by an inconsistent combination of difficult-to-
justify broad rules and a hodgepodge of miscellaneous exceptions.”). 
4 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). In the 1943 case of Johnson v. United States, the 
Supreme Court implied in dicta that adverse comment upon privileged silence would be 
inconsistent with “the requirements of fair trial.” 318 U.S. 189, 196 (1943). Taking up 
this question more formally four years later in Adamson v. California, however, the Court 
held that adverse comment on a defendant’s trial silence did not violate any constitutional 
right to a fair trial. 332 U.S. 46, 57–58 (1947); see infra Part I.C. In its opinion, the Court 
emphasized that Johnson was decided under a federal statute and not any provision of the 
Constitution. Adamson, 332 U.S. at 50 n.6. 
5 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999). 
6 Donald B. Ayer, The Fifth Amendment and the Inference of Guilt from Silence: 
Griffin v. California After Fifteen Years, 78 MICH. L. REV. 841, 842 (1980) (arguing that 
“the Griffin rule has seriously restricted state flexibility in trial procedure and has 
impaired the effective operation of the criminal system”); see also Amar & Lettow, supra
note 2, at 865 (1995) (characterizing Griffin as “controversial”); Stephen J. Schulhofer, 
Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 311, 
334 (1991) (defending Griffin, but recognizing that the decision has been 
“controversial”). In addition to the obvious limitations on argument created by Griffin,
the case has spawned an extensive body of law that attempts to draw the sometimes fine 
line between permissible characterizations of the evidence and impermissible comments 
on the failure of the accused to testify. See Prosecutorial Misconduct, 33 GEO. L.J. ANN.
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Griffin, Supreme Court Justices openly criticize the case as a “wrong turn” in 
constitutional jurisprudence,7 with one current Justice yearning for an 
opportunity to overrule the decision.8 Commentary has been equally 
derisive.9
REV. CRIM. PROC. 550, 553 n.1796 (2004) (collecting cases). For example, “[a] 
prosecutor’s comment that the government’s evidence is uncontradicted or unrebutted” 
violates the Fifth Amendment “if the only person who could have rebutted the evidence 
was the defendant.” United States v. Mietus, 237 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 2001); see also
United States v. Mulder, 273 F.3d 91, 109 (2d Cir. 2001) (same). 
7 See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 331–36 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 
and Thomas and O’Connor, JJ.); see also Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 72 n.3 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., with Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.) (criticizing analysis in 
Griffin as employing “a questionable manner of constitutional exegesis” and “rel[ying] 
upon” a “shak[y] proposition”); Chris Blair, Yes, Virginia, There Is a United States 
Constitution: Selected Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Cases from the Supreme 
Court’s 1998–99 Term, 35 TULSA L.J. 547, 560 (2000) (noting that “[f]our members of 
the Court are clearly dissatisfied with Griffin and Carter and do not think that the ban on 
adverse inference can be supported by the Constitution”). 
8 Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 343 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“I would be willing to 
reconsider Griffin . . . in the appropriate case.”). 
9 See Ayer, supra note 6, at 869–70 (arguing that “Griffin v. California is untenable 
as an article of fifth amendment jurisprudence” and created “a rule without any reasoned 
justification that has nonetheless stood as a restraint on criminal prosecution for fifteen 
years”); Jeffrey Bellin, Improving the Reliability of Criminal Trials Through Legal Rules 
That Encourage Defendants to Testify, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 851, 887–90 & n.127 (2008) 
(noting the “widespread recognition of Griffin’s questionable historical and constitutional 
underpinnings”); Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for 
Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 700 (1968) (criticizing Griffin as giving 
“inadequate weight to the language of the [Fifth] amendment that testimony must be 
‘compelled’”); Green, supra note 3, at 155–56 (criticizing the judicial prohibition of 
adverse comment on the ground that it fails to recognize the complex cost-benefit 
calculus of both trial silence and testimony); R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence As a Moral and 
Constitutional Right, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 15, 58 (1981) (criticizing Griffin doctrine 
on the ground that “[n]either the jurors’ drawing of natural inferences in the attempt to 
figure out where the truth lies, nor the judge’s comment about inferences that may 
naturally be drawn is a penalty” under the ordinary meaning of the word); Adam H. 
Kurland, Prosecuting Ol’ Man River: The Fifth Amendment, The Good Faith Defense, 
and the Non-Testifying Defendant, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 841, 875 n.111 (1990) (“The 
Griffin rule has been criticized persuasively as illogical and not justified by any 
legitimate policy rationales underlying the fifth amendment.” (citing Ayer, supra note 6, 
at 849)); John. H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 21 
(1978) (contending that “Griffin v. California . . . exaggerated the privilege [against self-
incrimination] to senseless lengths”); Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 1327, 1339, 1349 (2009) (arguing that Griffin “ought to be abandoned” 
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Griffin condemns adverse (i.e., negative) prosecutorial or judicial 
comment on a defendant’s refusal to testify as an unconstitutional “penalty” 
on a Fifth Amendment right. Jurists and commentators have criticized this 
reasoning on the ground that adverse comment constitutes a relatively minor 
penalty differing in degree and kind from the species of compulsion outlawed 
by the Fifth Amendment.10 In addition, critics point out that the Supreme 
Court has allowed a long list of penalties to be imposed upon a refusal to 
incriminate oneself, many of which appear to be at least as severe as the 
adverse comment Griffin forbids.11
In light of these largely unanswered criticisms, courts and commentators 
have struggled to place Griffin and its progeny within a coherent doctrinal 
because the rule it sets forth “makes little sense as a matter of constitutional law” and 
“cannot be justified in terms of the text or history of the Self-Incrimination Clause”); 
Barbara Rook Snyder, A Due Process Analysis of the Impeachment Use of Silence in 
Criminal Trials, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 285, 302–03 (1988) (criticizing Supreme 
Court’s doctrine on ground that Griffin’s penalty analysis is not consistently applied in 
other contexts (citing Geoffrey Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 
SUP. CT. REV. 99, 146 n.241, for similar criticism)). 
10 See, e.g., Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 331 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the 
prohibition of adverse comment arose in Supreme Court case law “[d]espite the text” of 
the Fifth Amendment); Griffin, 380 U.S. at 620 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (asserting that 
any compulsion created by adverse comment “is of a dramatically different and less 
palpable nature than that involved in the procedures which historically gave rise to the 
Fifth Amendment guarantee”); Anne Poulin, Evidentiary Use of Silence and the 
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 191, 236 
(1984) (critiquing the rationale articulated in Griffin on the ground that the burden 
highlighted by the Court is “arguably slight because the jury would observe the failure to 
testify even without the prosecution’s encouragement”); Sampsell-Jones, supra note 9, at 
1347 (“The threat of an adverse inference, which is after all a relatively trivial penalty 
compared to torture or contempt, does not constitute compulsion.”).  
11 See Ayer, supra note 6, at 847 (“the Court permits imposition of other burdens on 
defendants’ privilege to remain silent that are as great or greater than the burden imposed 
in Griffin”); Mark Berger, Of Policy, Politics, and Parliament: The Legislative Rewriting 
of the British Right to Silence, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 391, 426 (1995) (noting that “American 
law recognizes that the decision to remain silent is not necessarily cost-free” and that 
“[i]n numerous situations the courts have upheld the imposition of penalties that have 
been applied to individuals who asserted their privilege against self-incrimination”); 
Michael J. Hunter, The Man on the Stairs Who Wasn’t There: What Does a Defendant’s 
Pre-Arrest Silence Have to Do with Miranda, The Fifth Amendment, or Due Process?, 28 
HAMLINE L. REV. 277, 300 (2005) (arguing that application of the no-penalty “rationale 
contradicts, without any explanation, the Court’s consistent admonitions that not every 
constitutional choice made by a defendant, comes pain free”); see also infra Part II.A 
(discussing Supreme Court case law upholding various penalties for otherwise-protected 
silence). 
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framework.12 This Article takes up that challenge, seeking to reconceptualize 
the constitutional prohibition of adverse comment, and thereby place it on the 
firm doctrinal footing necessary for such a sweeping intrusion into state and 
federal criminal procedure. The Article concludes that the Fifth Amendment 
can be construed to prohibit adverse comment, but only if the prohibition’s 
scope is narrowed. 
As explained in more detail in the discussion to follow, in a certain 
subset of cases, adverse comment so exacerbates the plight of the silent 
defendant that it transforms a sharp-elbowed trial tactic into something akin 
to the compulsion to testify forbidden by the Fifth Amendment.13 In these 
cases, including most prominently the large number of trials where a 
defendant declines to testify to avoid the introduction of his prior criminal 
convictions, adverse comment is both: (i) unfair (in that it urges the jury to 
adopt a false and essentially unrebuttable inference of guilt from silence), 
12 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 53–54 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(criticizing the Court’s “failure to set forth a comprehensive theory of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination” in separating constitutional from 
unconstitutional penalties for silence); Alschuler, supra note 2, at 2628 n.11 (arguing that 
“[t]he majority’s reliance on the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in Griffin was 
unnecessary” and suggesting that the Court could alternatively have argued that adverse 
comment creates a situation where the defendant either testifies against herself by her 
silence or by her testimony); Ayer, supra note 6, at 866 (noting that legal scholars have 
long been “on the lookout for an alternative rationale for the Griffin rule”); Steven D. 
Clymer, Compelled Statements from Police Officers and Garrity Immunity, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1309, 1348 n.165 (2001) (stating that in Griffin the Court “[a]rguably . . . employed 
the [unconstitutional conditions] doctrine to invalidate conditions imposed on the Fifth 
Amendment privilege” but suggesting that the Griffin rule “is best explained” as stated in 
Alschuler, supra note 2, at 2628 n.11); Lissa Griffin, Is Silence Sacred? The 
Vulnerability of Griffin v. California in a Terrorist World, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 
927, 928–29 (2007) (highlighting the vulnerability of the prohibition of adverse comment 
in light of changes to the membership of the Supreme Court, the recent “U.S. experience 
with terrorism” and “the uncertain mooring of the privilege doctrinally”); Kurland, supra
note 9, at 875 n.111; Sampsell-Jones, supra note 9, at 1343 (critiquing Supreme Court’s 
prohibition of adverse comment on the ground that it has failed to articulate “some theory 
to explain which conditions are constitutionally acceptable and which are not”); Daniel J. 
Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic 
Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 490 (2000) (arguing 
that “the traditional rationales for the self-incrimination privilege do not adequately 
explain the Griffin doctrine”); Marcy Strauss, Silence, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 155 
(2001) (noting that there “does not appear to be a clear answer” in the case law separating 
impermissible burdens, like that in Griffin, from burdens deemed permissible in other 
cases).
13 See infra Part IV.A. 
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and (ii) a penalty imposed on the defendant’s refusal to incriminate 
himself.14 This combination of a particularly severe penalty for silence and a 
desire to avoid self-incrimination satisfies the necessary prerequisites for a 
Fifth Amendment violation. 
For Griffin’s proponents, this defense of the constitutional prohibition of 
adverse comment comes at a price. If one accepts, as this Article contends, 
that a Fifth Amendment prohibition of adverse comment depends for its 
doctrinal viability on the unfairness15 of that comment, it necessarily follows 
that the prohibition’s scope must be narrowed. In fact, defendant-specific 
analysis of the constitutional implications of adverse comment highlights two 
broad categories of silent defendants who, although protected under current 
doctrine, should not be shielded from adverse comment by the Fifth 
Amendment. 
First, many non-testifying criminal defendants, including defendants who 
decline to testify because they fear that the substance of their testimony will 
support rather than rebut the prosecution’s evidence, suffer no unfairness, 
and consequently only a mild “penalty,” when adverse comment is 
permitted.16 For these defendants, adverse comment highlights the actual 
reason for the defendant’s silence and parallels the harm inherent in any 
refusal to testify (the jury’s likely assumption that guilt—or at least the 
absence of a convincing rebuttal—explains the defendant’s silence).17 While 
the defendant’s silence may indeed be damaging, adverse comment on that 
silence results in a merely incremental penalty that does not approach the 
compulsion to testify outlawed by the Fifth Amendment. Defendants who fall 
into this category receive a constitutional windfall when, as under current 
doctrine, adverse comment is precluded. 
Second, some silent defendants who do suffer unfairness from adverse 
comment—and thus a significant penalty—nevertheless refuse to testify for 
reasons that are not protected by the Fifth Amendment (e.g., to avoid 
14 See infra Part IV. 
15 There are, of course, myriad forms of fairness at play in criminal trials. As the 
article will explain, the fairness rationale invoked here is that alluded to in Griffin itself—
that adverse comment (in certain circumstances) urges upon the jury a misleading 
inference, suggesting that silence indicates guilt when, in fact, there is a compelling 
alternative explanation for the defendant’s refusal to testify that cannot be revealed to the 
jurors. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614–15. 
16 See infra Part IV.B. 
17 See infra Part IV.B. 
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incriminating a third party).18 Again, these defendants enjoy a windfall when 
adverse comment is prohibited under a constitutional provision that has no 
application to their circumstances. 
Other commentators have recognized fairness (or a related reliability 
concern) as a potential justification for a prohibition of adverse comment, but 
have couched this justification in generic policy terms—i.e., that the 
unfairness of adverse comment itself warrants its preclusion.19 Indeed, 
similar concerns are obliquely alluded to in Griffin itself.20 These naked 
policy arguments, however, support only a statutory prohibition of adverse 
comment, akin to those in effect in a majority of American jurisdictions prior 
18 See infra Part IV.B. Significantly, this criticism applies whether or not one 
accepts the underlying thesis of this Article that unfairness is a necessary prerequisite of a 
Fifth Amendment violation in this context. 
19 See, e.g., Amar & Lettow, supra note 2, at 866 (surveying Fifth Amendment 
doctrine and asserting that Griffin “can stand” on “reliability” grounds); Peter Arenella, 
Foreword: O.J. Lessons, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1246–47 (1996) (asserting that “Steve 
Schulhofer has offered the best defense of Griffin” by asserting that its prohibition of 
adverse inferences from silence protects innocent defendants “who fear taking the stand 
because they will be impeached by their prior criminal record and those whose 
nervousness, appearance, or lack of mental agility might enable a prosecutor to make 
them look and sound guilty through artful cross-examination”); Craig M. Bradley & 
Joseph L. Hoffmann, Public Perception, Justice, and the “Search For Truth” in Criminal 
Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1267, 1285–86 (1996) (recognizing that the “problem” with 
overruling Griffin “is that as long as the main reason for a defendant not testifying is the 
fear of impeachment with what would otherwise be inadmissible prior convictions, it is 
inappropriate for the prosecutor to claim (or the jury to infer) that the defendant did not 
testify because of guilt”); Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-
Bayesian [!?] Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. REV. 637, 678 (1991) 
(“So long as the law more readily allows use of prior convictions against an accused if he 
takes the stand than if he does not, the rule in Griffin v. California . . . seems almost 
inevitable. It is not acceptable to allow a prosecutor to encourage a jury to think that the 
accused stayed off the stand because he could not give credible exculpatory evidence 
when, in fact, the defendant was intimidated from testifying by the threat that doing so 
would open up his prior criminal record or otherwise expose him to character 
impeachment.”); cf. Sampsell-Jones, supra note 9, at 1355–56 (arguing for abolition of 
the Griffin rule and its replacement with a policy-based statutory regime that would 
prohibit adverse comment in circumstances where the “defendant will not be able to 
explain his decision to remain silent without revealing unfairly prejudicial information to 
the jury”). Sampsell-Jones’s article parallels this author’s own system-wide prescriptions 
designed to incentivize defendant testimony. See id. at 1339 & n.59 (recognizing Bellin’s 
2008 article as “a recent article arguing for a similar set of proposed reforms” to those 
being proposed by Sampsell-Jones). 
20 See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615. 
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to the Griffin decision. Unless placed within a Fifth Amendment rubric (as 
sketched out above and developed more fully in Part IV), these arguments 
fall short of justifying a constitutional prohibition. In addition, the fairness 
(and reliability) concerns implicated by adverse comment support only a 
narrowly drawn, defendant-specific prohibition of adverse comment, not the 
blanket prohibition that currently exists. 
Thus, the implications of this Article’s thesis for Griffin’s proponents are 
mixed. The good news is that a fairness rationale implicit within existing 
Fifth Amendment case law can be used to shore up the unstable 
constitutional footing of the prohibition of adverse comment. In addition, the 
rationale proposed here meets three criteria likely to appeal to the judiciary 
(the source of any future reforms): (i) it retains the current Fifth Amendment 
grounding for the prohibition of adverse comment;21 (ii) it integrates the 
prohibition into the Supreme Court’s existing Fifth Amendment “penalty” 
jurisprudence, including the otherwise anomalous treatment of adverse 
comment in United States v. Robinson;22 and (iii) it heeds the constitutional 
text, explaining why adverse comment can (in certain circumstances) be 
analogized to being “compelled” to testify. The bad news, of course, is that 
21 The proposed rationale, which emphasizes fairness and case-by-case analysis, 
would also fit comfortably in a due process (i.e., “fair trial”) framework. If the Supreme 
Court were proceeding on a clean slate, this might indeed be the most advisable doctrinal 
cure for its ailing jurisprudence. The Court is not operating on a clean slate, however. The 
Court squarely rejected the claim that due process prohibits adverse comment in 
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 54 (1947), and reaffirmed this holding in Baxter v. 
Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976). The Court has similarly set a high bar for 
defendants invoking due process to challenge permissive inferences urged upon the jury. 
See County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979) (holding that jury inferences violate 
due process only “if, under the facts of the case, there is no rational way the trier could 
make the connection permitted by the inference”). In concert with the Supreme Court’s 
explicit grounding of the existing prohibition of adverse comment in the self-
incrimination clause, the Court’s cases interpreting the Due Process Clause likely 
foreclose any due process rationale for a prohibition of adverse comment. Cf. Portuondo,
529 U.S. at 74 (explaining that to the extent a Fifth Amendment claim overlaps with a 
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim, it should be analyzed under the Fifth 
Amendment, and citing prior case law for the proposition that “where an Amendment 
‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection . . . that Amendment, not 
the more generalized notion of “substantive due process,” must be the guide for analyzing 
[the] claims’” (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989))). In any event, a 
defensible rule anchored in the Due Process Clause would be similar, if not identical, to 
the rule proposed here under a Fifth Amendment, compelled self-incrimination rationale. 
22 485 U.S. 25, 32 (1988) (holding that adverse comment is permissible 
“where . . . the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant’s opportunity to testify is a fair 
response to a claim made by defendant or his counsel”). 
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the rationale, and underlying analysis, exposes the substantial overbreadth of 
the existing constitutional prohibition of adverse comment. 
The argument is presented in four interrelated parts. The first part 
sketches the historical background of the prohibition of adverse comment, a 
prohibition enforced exclusively by statute until the 1965 Griffin decision. 
Part II endorses the two primary critiques of the constitutional rule 
announced in Griffin: (i) that adverse comment cannot, as a general matter, 
be analogized to the compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment; and 
(ii) that Griffin is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s other Fifth 
Amendment “penalty” jurisprudence. Part III proposes a much needed, 
alternative doctrinal rationale for a Fifth Amendment prohibition of adverse 
comment, and Part IV explores the viability and implications of the narrow 
prohibition of adverse comment justified by the proposed rationale. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PROHIBITION OF ADVERSE COMMENT IN 
AMERICAN COURTS
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 1965 decision in Griffin v. California, there 
was no uniform American rule governing the treatment of a defendant’s 
silence at trial. Some jurisdictions allowed adverse comment on such silence 
and others prohibited it. This patchwork system reflected a general 
understanding, supported by the history and text of the pertinent provisions 
of the United States Constitution, that the nation’s founders had little to say 
on the subject, leaving the permissibility of adverse comment to be 
determined by state and federal legislatures. 
A. The History and Text of the Fifth Amendment
The absence of a constitutional prohibition of adverse comment for most 
of the nation’s history follows quite naturally from the dearth of textual or 
historical support for any such constitutional prohibition.23 The text of the 
Fifth Amendment prohibits being “compelled . . . to be a witness,” implying 
that a person aggrieved by a violation of the textual command has either 
testified against her will or suffered the introduction of an involuntary out-of-
court statement. Adverse comment arises, however, only when the defendant 
declines to testify. A defendant who sits silently at trial may have grounds to 
23 Cf. Lissa Griffin, supra note 12, at 961 (“To the extent that the Supreme Court’s 
support for the rule is based neither on text nor history, it has been criticized and 
continues to be vulnerable.”). 
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complain about judicial or prosecutorial disparagement of her trial silence, 
but those grounds do not include any obvious violation of the literal 
command that she cannot be “compelled . . . to be a witness.”24
The historical case for a prohibition of adverse comment on a 
defendant’s refusal to testify is equally problematic. At the time of the 
enactment of the Bill of Rights, and in the decades that followed, criminal 
defendants were barred from testifying.25 Thus, the nation’s founders could 
not have intended, in enacting the Fifth Amendment, to prohibit adverse 
comment on a defendant’s “decision” not to testify.26
In fact, the historical record suggests that, if anything, the founders 
would have endorsed adverse comment on defendant silence. While 
forbidden from testifying, criminal defendants in the founding era were 
invited to speak at their trials, both through a “pretrial statement” to the 
presiding magistrate and by functioning as their own counsel.27 If the 
defendant, despite these opportunities, refused to personally present an 
24 See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 331 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the 
prohibition of adverse comment arose in Supreme Court case law “[d]espite the text” of 
the Fifth Amendment); Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 309 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (noting that “no one here claims that the defendant was forced to take the 
stand against his will or to testify against himself inconsistently with the provisions of the 
Fifth Amendment”); Ayer, supra note 6, at 852 (contending that the text of the 
amendment “would not seem, at first blush, even to remotely address the situation where 
a defendant does not become a witness”). See infra Part II, for the Court’s response to 
this textual argument. 
25 See Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 164 (1986) (“The right of an accused to 
testify in his defense is of relatively recent origin. Until the latter part of the preceding 
century, criminal defendants in this country, as at common law, were considered to be 
disqualified from giving sworn testimony at their own trial by reason of their interest as a 
party to the case.”); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 214 (1971). 
26 See McGautha, 402 U.S. at 214 (“Inasmuch as at the time of framing of the Fifth 
Amendment and for many years thereafter the accused in criminal cases was not allowed 
to testify in his own behalf, nothing approaching [the defendant’s] dilemma [as to 
whether to testify] could arise.”). 
27 Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 65–67 (explaining that in 1791, “[d]efendants routinely 
were asked (and agreed) to provide a pretrial statement to a justice of the peace detailing 
the events in dispute” and “typically spoke and conducted their defense personally, 
without counsel”); Witt, supra note 3, at 911 (“Pretrial questioning of the accused was 
the pervasive practice in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, and that 
evidence was often a critical part of the prosecution’s case against the accused at trial.”). 
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exculpatory version of events, the prosecutor could highlight the omission 
and invite the factfinder to draw an adverse inference.28
B. Federal and State Statutes Regarding Defendant Silence
Implicitly recognizing the Constitution’s silence on the question, 
Congress addressed the evidentiary treatment of a defendant’s refusal to 
testify by statute in 1878. The statute’s primary purpose was to “free[] the 
accused in a federal prosecution from his common law disability as a 
witness.”29 Reflecting concerns of criminal justice reformers of the era, 
however, the statute included protections for defendants who, despite their 
newfound freedom to testify, might “not wish to be witnesses.”30 In the 
words of the statute, the defendant could “at his own request” become “a 
competent witness,” but “[h]is failure to make such request shall not create 
any presumption against him.”31
28 Alschuler, supra note 2, at 2631 (“Until the nineteenth century was well 
underway, magistrates and judges in . . . America expected and encouraged suspects and 
defendants to speak during pretrial interrogation and again at trial. Fact finders did not 
hesitate to draw inferences of guilt when defendants remained silent.”); Amar & Lettow, 
supra note 2, at 897–98 (explaining that at the time of ratification of the Bill of Rights, a 
defendant’s decision to stand mute in the face of pretrial accusation “could be laid before 
a later criminal jury for whatever inferences they might draw” (citation omitted)); see 
Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 333 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The justice of the peace 
testified at trial as to the content of the defendant’s [pre-trial] statement; if the defendant 
refused to speak, this would also have been reported to the jury.”). Drawing on this 
historical evidence, Professor Alschuler argues that the Fifth Amendment “was not 
intended to afford defendants a right to remain silent or to refuse to respond to 
incriminating questions,” but rather “[i]ts purpose was to outlaw torture and other 
improper methods of interrogation.” Alschuler, supra note 2, at 2631. For a discussion of 
the complexity of the historical origins of the Fifth Amendment, see Witt, supra note 3, at 
832–33 (describing numerous theories put forth by scholars to explain historical origins 
of the Fifth Amendment). 
29 Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 292 (1939); Wilson v. United States, 149
U.S. 60, 66 (1893) (“In mercy to him, he is by the act in question permitted upon his 
request to testify in his own behalf in the case.”). 
30 Wilson, 149 U.S. at 66; see Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 578 (1961) 
(explaining that many of those who opposed permitting defendant testimony feared that 
the reform “threatened erosion of the privilege against self-incrimination and the 
presumption of innocence”). 
31 Act of Mar. 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3481 
(2006)). 
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Justice Stephen Field, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court in 
Wilson v. United States, applied the statute to a prosecutor’s reference in 
closing argument to the defendant’s trial silence. The prosecutor had argued 
that, in contrast to the defendant, if he (the prosecutor) were ever on trial, “‘I 
will go upon the stand and hold up my hand before high heaven and testify to 
my innocence of the crime.’”32 The Court held that the prosecutor’s 
comment, together with the trial court’s failure “to condemn the reference,” 
violated the federal statute.33
In addition to applying the statute, Justice Field’s opinion endorsed its 
wisdom, emphasizing that forbidding an adverse presumption from trial 
silence protected not only guilty defendants but also innocent defendants 
who were incapable of effectively testifying on their own behalf. In what 
would become a particularly significant passage, Justice Field opined that: 
It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand though 
entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness 
when facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious 
character, and offences charged against him, will often confuse and 
embarrass [a defendant] to such a degree as to increase rather than remove 
prejudices against him.34
Foreshadowing the later development of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence 
in this context, the Supreme Court expanded the protections announced in 
Wilson in Bruno v. United States.35 In Bruno, the Court held that the federal 
statute not only precluded adverse comment, but also required the district 
court, upon request, to instruct the jury not to consider the defendant’s failure 
to testify in evaluating his guilt.36
Paralleling the federal model, the vast majority of the States also enacted 
statutory bars to adverse comment as they swept away traditional rules 
precluding defendant testimony. By the time the Griffin decision essentially 
constitutionalized the federal statute in 1965,37 only six states permitted 
32 Wilson, 149 U.S. at 66 (quoting words of district attorney).  
33 Id. at 68. 
34 Id. at 66. 
35 308 U.S. at 294. 
36 Id. at 293. 
37 See United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 29 n.4 (1988) (noting that while 
“prohibition on adverse comment concerning a defendant’s failure to testify” was 
originally “grounded solely in” the federal statute, “the scope of the Fifth Amendment 
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adverse comment on a defendant’s trial silence: California, Ohio, New 
Jersey, Iowa, Connecticut and New Mexico.38
California’s rule, incorporated into the state’s constitution, stated:  
No person shall . . . be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness 
against himself . . . but in any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies 
or not, his failure to explain or to deny by his testimony any evidence or 
facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the court and by 
counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury.39
In applying this rule, the California courts limited the type of adverse 
comment permitted. The courts permitted adverse comment or instruction 
only with respect to facts that were within the defendant’s “power” to explain 
or deny, and emphasized that the defendant’s refusal to testify could not 
substitute for a failure of proof of any element of the prosecutor’s case.40
While outside the mainstream of American jurisprudence, comment in this 
fashion was accepted by the Model Code of Evidence, and the Uniform 
Rules of Evidence, “endorsed by resolution of the American Bar Association 
and the American Law Institute, and [had] the support of the weight of 
scholarly opinion.”41
has been expanded to encompass in large part the terrain previously occupied” by that 
statute (citation omitted)). 
38 Peter W. Tague, The Fifth Amendment: If an Aid to the Guilty Defendant, an 
Impediment to the Innocent One, 78 GEO. L.J. 1, 20 n.94 (1989) (“Many 
states, . . . beginning with Massachusetts in 1866, forbade comment on the defendant’s 
refusal to testify and forbade the jury to draw an inference against the defendant. . . . By 
the 1950s, six states still permitted comment or let the jury draw an inference.”); see also
Griffin, 380 U.S. at 611, n.3 (“The overwhelming consensus of the States, however, is 
opposed to allowing comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. The legislatures or 
courts of 44 States have recognized that such comment is, in light of the privilege against 
self-incrimination, ‘an unwarrantable line of argument.’” (citation omitted)); Adamson v. 
California, 332 U.S. 46, 55 & n.16 (1947) (stating that “[g]enerally, comment on the 
failure of an accused to testify is forbidden in American jurisdictions” and citing 
California, New Jersey, Ohio, and Vermont as states permitting adverse comment). 
39 People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753, 759 n.1 (Cal. 1965) (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, 
§ 13 (1934) (repealed 1974)); People v. Adamson, 165 P.2d 3, 7 (Cal. 1946) (same). 
40 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 621–22 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Adamson, 165 P.2d at 9–10.
In addition, adverse comment was not permitted until the prosecution, “at the trial, has 
made out a prima facie case against [the defendant].” People v. Talle, 245 P.2d 633, 
641 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952). 
41 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 622 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also
Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 337 n.5 (1978) (recognizing that the practice 
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C. The Due Process Challenge to Adverse Comment
For almost a century after Wilson, the Supreme Court had no occasion to 
determine whether the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
precluded adverse comment on the silence of an accused. Although rules 
permitting adverse comment persisted in a handful of states, the Court 
insisted until 1964 that the Fifth Amendment did not apply in state 
prosecutions.42
The Supreme Court did entertain challenges under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to state rules permitting adverse comment. The challengers 
contended that adverse comment on trial silence violated that amendment’s 
command “by depriving [them] of their life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.”43 The Supreme Court resolved the most significant of these 
challenges in Adamson v. California, where it held that California’s rule 
permitting adverse comment did not deprive defendants of due process. 44
disapproved in Griffin “at one time . . . enjoyed the approval of the American Law 
Institute and the American Bar Association” and that “instructions similar to those at 
issue in Griffin had been sanctioned by the Model Code of Evidence and the Uniform 
Rules of Evidence”); Ayer, supra note 6, at 842 n.8 (“In the years preceding Griffin there 
was significant sentiment in informed circles for allowing such comment.”). 
42 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (incorporating the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination via the Fourteenth Amendment). 
43 See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 91, 99 (1908) (citing U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV). The first case to resolve the question, Twining v. New Jersey, held that “the 
exemption from compulsory self-incrimination in the courts of the States is not secured 
by any part of the Federal Constitution.” 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908). The Court explicitly 
noted:  
It is not argued that the defendants are protected by that part of the Fifth 
Amendment which provides that “no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal 
case to be a witness against himself,” for it is recognized by counsel that by a long 
line of decisions the first ten Amendments are not operative on the States. 
Id. at 93 (citations omitted). It should also be noted that the Fifth Amendment contains a 
“due process” clause that has been interpreted to have the same meaning as the clause 
contained in the Fourteenth Amendment. Kenneth W. Gaines, Instruct The Jury: Crane’s 
“Serious Difficulty” Requirement and Due Process, 56 S.C. L. REV. 291, 293 n.9 (2004) 
(explaining that “[c]ourts have generally interpreted the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth 
and Fourteenth Amendments identically” and citing cases). 
44 332 U.S. at 57–58. The Court in Adamson assumed for purposes of its opinion 
that the Fifth Amendment would have prohibited the adverse comment at issue, but 
suggested its disagreement with the assumption in a footnote. The Court noted that “[t]he 
California law protects a defendant against compulsion to testify, though allowing 
comment upon his failure to meet evidence against him,” while “[t]he Fifth Amendment 
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The Adamson Court began its analysis by emphasizing that the rights 
specifically enumerated in the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the States 
and thus state courts (unlike their federal counterparts) were not precluded 
from compelling defendants to testify in criminal trials.45 The Court 
conceded, however, that certain forms of compulsion might render a trial 
fundamentally unfair, and thereby violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process guarantee.46 For example, “[t]he due process clause forbids 
compulsion to testify by fear of hurt, torture or exhaustion.”47
In examining California’s rule, the Court found nothing sufficiently 
unfair or coercive to violate due process. In fact, the Court stated, the 
inference permitted by the California rule—that the prosecution’s evidence 
could be thought more compelling if the defendant, despite the opportunity to 
do so, declined to contradict it—“seem[ed] quite natural.”48
Anticipating this response, the defendant in Adamson highlighted one 
aspect of California’s rule as particularly unfair.49 In California, as in the vast 
majority of American jurisdictions, criminal defendants who take the witness 
stand are subject to general credibility impeachment through the introduction 
of evidence of their criminal record. If, however, they do not testify, such 
evidence is ordinarily prohibited.50 Given this looming threat of 
forbids compulsion on a defendant to testify.” Id. at 50 n.6. The Court added that “[a] 
federal statute that grew out of the extension of permissible witnesses to include those 
charged with offenses negatives a presumption against an accused for failure to avail 
himself of the right to testify in his own defense” but emphasized that “[i]t was this 
statute which is interpreted to protect the defendant against comment for his claim of 
privilege,” not the Constitution. Id.
45 Id. at 54. 
46 Id. at 53 (“A right to a fair trial is a right admittedly protected by the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” (citations omitted)). 
47 Id. at 54. 
48 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 56; see also id. at 60 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(“Sensible and just-minded men, in important affairs of life, deem it significant that a 
man remains silent when confronted with serious and responsible evidence against 
himself which it is within his power to contradict. The notion that to allow jurors to do 
that which sensible and rightminded men do every day violates the ‘immutable principles 
of justice’ as conceived by a civilized society is to trivialize the importance of ‘due 
process.’”). 
49 Id. at 56 (“Appellant sets out the circumstances of this case, however, to show 
coercion and unfairness in permitting comment.”). 
50 The Adamson Court recognized that California law “forces an accused who is a 
repeated offender to choose between the risk of having his prior offenses disclosed to the 
jury or of having it draw harmful inferences from uncontradicted evidence that can only 
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impeachment, the petitioner in Adamson contended, “he could not take the 
stand to deny the evidence against him” and thus neutralize the adverse 
inference permitted by California law.51 If he did, “he would be subjected to 
a cross-examination as to former crimes to impeach his veracity and the 
evidence so produced might well bring about his conviction.”52
The Supreme Court was unmoved. The dilemma faced by a criminal 
defendant of either “leaving . . . adverse evidence unexplained” or 
“subjecting himself to impeachment through disclosure of former crimes” 
while “difficult” did “not seem unfair,” or, at least, was not so unfair as to 
constitute a denial of due process.53
D. The Penalty Doctrine of Griffin v. California 
Despite its triumph in Adamson, the ultimate fate of the California rule 
permitting adverse comment was sealed in 1964. In that year, the Supreme 
Court (which no longer included any member of the Adamson majority) 
broke with long settled precedent to hold, in Malloy v. Hogan, that the Fifth 
Amendment applied to the States.54 In addition, the Court stated in sweeping 
dicta that the Fifth Amendment guarantees not just freedom from 
traditionally prohibited forms of compulsion (e.g., torture), but “the right of a 
person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise 
of his own will” and the right “to suffer no penalty . . . for such silence.”55
Less than one year after Malloy, the Supreme Court finally vindicated the 
be denied or explained by the defendant.” Id. at 49. Adamson had suffered prior 
convictions for burglary, larceny and robbery. Id.
51 Id. at 57. 
52 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 57; cf. Bellin, supra note 9, at 865 (describing how “the 
general prohibition of evidence of a defendant’s prior convictions as substantive 
evidence” combined with “a rule permitting the use of that evidence to impeach a 
testifying defendant” may “deter[] even innocent defendants from testifying” (citation 
omitted)). 
53 Adamson, 332 U.S. at 57–58; see also id. at 60 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(discussing the dilemma of defendant with prior convictions at greater length, but 
concluding that dilemma did not violate Due Process Clause). 
54 378 U.S. 1, 6–11 (1964); see Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 
(2000) (“In Malloy, we held that the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause is 
incorporated in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and thus applies to 
the States.”). 
55 Malloy, 378 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added). 
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California rule’s detractors in the landmark decision of Griffin v. 
California.56
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, began by emphasizing the 
stark facts of the Griffin case, which allowed the prosecutor to “ma[k]e 
much” of the defendant’s failure to testify.57 The prosecutor had pointed out 
that the defendant was seen with the murder victim on the evening of her 
death and “‘certainly knows’” what happened to her, but “‘has not seen fit to 
take the stand and . . . explain.’”58 The trial court, then, buttressed the 
prosecutor’s argument by instructing the jury it could take the defendant’s 
failure to testify “into consideration as tending to indicate the truth of [the 
prosecution’s] evidence” as to “any evidence or facts against him which the 
defendant can reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts 
within his knowledge.”59
Having highlighted the damaging nature of adverse comment, the Griffin
Court next critiqued the validity of the inference such comment invited. 
Countering its earlier statement in Adamson, the Court observed that the 
inference of guilt from silence “is not always . . . natural or irresistible.”60
Contrary to the intuitive logic underlying California’s rule, the Court pointed 
out, a defendant might decline to take the witness stand for reasons 
completely unrelated to guilt or innocence (for example, to preclude 
disclosure of criminal convictions).61 In addition, the Griffin Court cited the 
venerable Wilson dicta that unsophisticated defendants plagued with 
“[e]xcessive timidity” or “nervousness when facing others” cannot “safely 
venture on the witness stand” even if entirely innocent.62
56 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). The changing membership of the Court undoubtedly 
played a role in the Court’s evolution from Adamson to Griffin. Justices Black and 
Douglas were the only two Justices who were on the Court for both Griffin and Adamson;
both Justices dissented in Adamson and were in the majority in Griffin.
57 Id. at 610. 
58 Id. at 610–11. 
59 Id. at 610. 
60 Id. at 614–15. 
61 Id. at 615 (stating that if a defendant with prior convictions declines to testify, 
then, “‘another possible inference can be drawn from his refusal to take the stand’” 
(quoting People v. Modesto, 398 P.2d 753, 763 (Cal. 1965))). The defendant-with-prior-
convictions argument had, in fact, constituted the primary thrust of the petitioner’s 
appellate brief before the Supreme Court. See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 10–12, 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (No. 202), 1964 WL 81335.  
62 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 
(1893)). 
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Despite its rhetorical emphasis on the prejudicial impact of adverse 
comment and its potentially misleading nature, the Court declined to place 
either of these factors in a doctrinal framework. In fact, apart from explicitly 
anchoring its holding in the Fifth Amendment, the balance of Justice 
Douglas’s opinion is largely conclusory.63 The opinion labels California’s 
rule, “a remnant of the ‘inquisitorial system of criminal justice,’”64 and with 
a nod (but no citation) to Malloy, declares that “[c]omment on the refusal to 
testify” constitutes a “penalty imposed by the courts for exercising a 
constitutional privilege.”65 The opinion then concludes, without caveats of 
any kind, that the Fifth Amendment “forbids either comment by the 
prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court that such 
silence is evidence of guilt.”66
Griffin left open the question of whether in addition to prohibiting 
adverse comment, trial courts must (as required under federal statutory law 
per Bruno)67 instruct the jury not to draw any adverse inference from a 
defendant’s trial silence. Seventeen years later, the Court answered this 
question in the affirmative in Carter v. Kentucky.68 The Court also took the 
opportunity to reaffirm Griffin, explaining that the “case stands for the 
63 Sampsell-Jones, supra note 9, at 1341 (noting that the opinion in Griffin “was, to 
put it gently, sparse” and its “legal analysis essentially consisted of two sentences”). In a 
recent book, Jeffrey Rosen characterizes Justice Douglas’s opinions generally as 
“[b]reezy, polemical, and unconcerned with the fine points of legal doctrine” and asserts 
that “they read more like today’s blog entries than carefully reasoned constitutional 
arguments.” JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT: THE PERSONALITIES & RIVALRIES 
THAT DEFINED AMERICA 132 (2006). Rosen states that Justice Douglas, in fact, 
“[s]corn[ed] the constraints of constitutional text and previous legal precedents as 
window dressing” and “believed . . . that law was essentially politics.” Id. at 132–33. 
64 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614. 
65 Id.
66 Id. at 615. The opinion sidesteps, without comment, the due process rationale 
rejected in Adamson. In fact, as the dissenters made clear, the petitioner in Griffin did not 
even raise a due process challenge—presumably because “[t]his Court long ago decided 
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not of its own force 
forbid this kind of comment on a defendant’s failure to testify.” Griffin, 380 U.S. at 619 
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), overruled by
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), 
overruled by Malloy, 378 U.S. 1). 
67 See supra text accompanying note 36. 
68 450 U.S. 288, 303 (1981). 
248 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:2 
proposition that a defendant must pay no court-imposed price for the exercise 
of his constitutional privilege not to testify.”69
In sharp contrast to Griffin, the thrust of the analysis in Carter consists of 
downplaying the significance of adverse comment. Highlighting a point 
raised by the dissent in Griffin, the Carter Court explained that the 
“penalty . . . exacted . . . by adverse comment on the defendant’s silence” 
may “be just as severe when there is no adverse comment, but when the jury 
is left to roam at large with only its untutored instincts to guide it, to draw 
from the defendant’s silence broad inferences of guilt.”70 From this premise, 
it followed that to further minimize the pressure to testify recognized in 
Griffin, “the Fifth Amendment requires that a criminal trial judge must give a 
‘no-adverse-inference’ jury instruction when requested by a defendant to do 
so.”71
Despite their doctrinal shortcomings,72 the holdings of Griffin and Carter
remain largely intact today, forming one of the defining features of American 
criminal trials.73 In every criminal trial in America, when a defendant 
69 Id. at 301. 
70 Id. Justice Stewart dissented in Griffin, but nevertheless wrote the majority 
opinion in Carter. In his dissent in Griffin, he criticized the majority on the ground, 
among others, that California’s rule might, in fact, protect silent defendants by “carefully 
controlling” the jury’s evaluation of trial silence. Griffin, 380 U.S. at 621 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). Justice Stewart contrasted this with the more chaotic situation where “the 
jury [is] left to roam at large with only its untutored instincts [as a] guide.” Id.
71 Carter, 450 U.S. at 300. The instruction erroneously rejected by the trial court in 
Carter was as follows: “‘The [defendant] is not compelled to testify and the fact that he 
does not cannot be used as an inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any 
way.”’ Id. at 294. 
72 See infra Part II. 
73 Legal systems in other countries, including England, permit adverse inferences 
from silence. See Lissa Griffin, supra note 12, at 951 (noting that English law “permits a 
negative inference to be drawn based on a defendant’s failure to testify at trial”); Renée 
Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for an American 
Murder in the French Cour D’Assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791, 825 ( “[A] defendant [in 
France] is not informed at trial that he has the right to remain silent . . . . The tone of 
[questioning] to him indicates that a reply is expected, and that adverse inferences will be 
drawn if [he] does not answer. . . . There is no doubt that, in practice, a refusal to testify 
would be devastating. In the French legal culture, defendants are expected to speak . . . .” 
(citation omitted)); Mike Redmayne, English Warnings, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1047, 1047 
n.1 (2008) (noting that, in addition to the criminal justice system of England and Wales, 
the justice system in Signapore allows adverse inferences from trial silence); Gordon Van 
Kessel, Quieting The Guilty and Acquitting the Innocent: A Close Look at a New Twist on 
the Right to Silence, 35 IND. L. REV. 925, 927 & n.5 (2002) (recognizing that in 
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declines to testify, Griffin prohibits adverse comment on the defendant’s 
silence and Carter requires an instruction, upon request, that the jury may not 
consider the defendant’s failure to testify for any purpose. A violation of 
either of these rules will generally require reversal of any conviction 
subsequently obtained.74
II. THE ABSENCE OF COMPULSION IN GRIFFIN AND CARTER
The penalty rationale set forth in Griffin provides a plausible response to 
the textual problem discussed in Part I, supra, that a defendant exposed to 
adverse comment has, by definition, not been compelled to be “a witness.”75
A penalty imposed on protected silence can be viewed as an attempt, albeit 
an unsuccessful one, to compel testimony by increasing the anticipated cost 
of withholding that testimony. It is this effort, the Court has ruled, 
“regardless of its ultimate effectiveness,” that violates the Fifth 
Amendment.76
“England, Israel, and a few other countries . . . factfinders [are] legally permitted to draw 
inferences of guilt from silence during police questioning and at trial” and noting that 
“[t]he European Court of Human Rights has found that with certain protections such use 
of silence does not violate the right to a fair trial under the” European Convention on 
Human Rights). 
74 See Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593, 596 (1968) (reversing state conviction 
based on Griffin error); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (holding that error 
under Griffin requires reversal unless the prosecution establishes that the error “was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” and reversing state conviction for Griffin error); 
United States v. Soto, 519 F.3d 927, 930–31 (9th Cir. 2008) (error in failing to give 
Carter instruction requires reversal unless harmless beyond reasonable doubt). 
75 See supra text accompanying notes 23, 24. 
76 Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805–06 (1977) (“[T]he privilege against 
compelled self-incrimination could not abide any ‘attempt, regardless of its ultimate 
effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers . . . .’” (quoting Gardner v. 
Broderick, 392 U.S. 273, 279 (1968))); see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 463 (1981) 
(“Any effort by the State to compel respondent to testify against his will at the sentencing 
hearing clearly would contravene the Fifth Amendment.”). 
In dissent in Adamson, Justice Murphy suggested an alternative solution to the literal 
incongruity between the Fifth Amendment text and a prohibition of adverse inferences. 
Justice Murphy wrote that a rule permitting adverse inferences “compels a defendant to 
be a witness against himself in one of two ways.” Adamson, 332 U.S. at 124. First, if he 
remains silent and an adverse inference is invoked, “he is compelled, through his silence, 
to testify against himself” and “silence can be as effective in this situation as oral 
statements.” Id. Second, if he testifies, “he is necessarily compelled to testify against 
himself” through exposure to cross-examination; “his testimony on cross-examination is 
the result of the coercive pressure of the provision rather than his own volition.” Id.
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This resolution of the textual problem, however, raises a subsequent 
question of degree. The Fifth Amendment does not, like the federal statute 
analyzed in Wilson, preclude “any presumption against” a silent defendant;77
rather, it prohibits being “compelled” to be a witness.78 This dictates the 
conclusion that “a necessary element” of a violation of the Amendment “is 
some kind of compulsion.”79 The dissenters in Griffin seized on this 
constitutional prerequisite, arguing that “if any compulsion [could] be 
detected” in California’s rule permitting adverse comment, “it is of a 
dramatically different and less palpable nature than that involved in the 
procedures which historically gave rise to the Fifth Amendment 
guarantee.”80 Justice Scalia, joined by three other Justices, echoed this 
criticism thirty-five years later in Mitchell v. United States, bemoaning the 
expansion of Griffin to the sentencing context.81 Commentators too have 
persuasively criticized Griffin for giving “inadequate weight to the language 
of the amendment that testimony must be ‘compelled.”’82 As these critics 
Similarly in Chapman v. California, the Supreme Court, in considering the prejudicial 
impact of prosecutorial comment and judicial instruction deemed improper under Griffin,
framed the harm that resulted as follows: “by their silence petitioners had served as 
irrefutable witnesses against themselves.” 386 U.S. 18, 25 (1967); see also Alschuler, 
supra note 2, at 2628 n.11 (arguing that “[t]he majority’s reliance on the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions in Griffin was unnecessary” and suggesting that the Court 
could alternatively have argued that adverse comment creates a situation where the 
defendant either testifies against herself by her silence or by her testimony); Craig M. 
Bradley, Griffin v. California: Still Viable After All These Years, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1290, 
1296 n.31 (1981) (“If the no comment rule is abolished the defendant can’t avoid 
‘helping’ the prosecution, for either silence or testimony will be used against him.”). But 
see Ayer, supra note 6, at 868 (“The defendant’s decision to remain silent is not a 
testimonial or communicative act to which the fifth amendment applies.”). 
77 Act of Mar. 16, 1878, ch. 37, 20 Stat. 30 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3481 
(2006)). 
78 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
79 Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304 (1966) (“[S]ince at least as long ago as 
1807, when Chief Justice Marshall first gave attention to the matter in the trial of Aaron 
Burr, all have agreed that a necessary element of compulsory self-incrimination is some 
kind of compulsion.”); see also McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 35–36 (2002) (plurality 
opinion) (“The ‘Amendment speaks of compulsion,’ and the Court has insisted that the 
‘constitutional guarantee is only that the witness not be compelled to give self-
incriminating testimony.’” (citation omitted)). 
80 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 620 (Stewart, J., dissenting).  
81 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 331 (1999). 
82 Friendly, supra note 9, at 700; see also Ayer, supra note 6, at 864 (“The integrity 
of the Griffin rule can no longer be maintained on the theory that comment-generated 
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rightly insist, the compulsion requirement of the Fifth Amendment mandates 
some threshold that any complained of pressure to testify (or penalty for 
failing to testify) must pass for that pressure to constitute a constitutional 
violation.83
A. The Fifth Amendment Does Not Bar All Penalties for Silence
Griffin and Carter sidestep the critical question of degree by suggesting, 
as a doctrinal matter, that the question is irrelevant because (as stated in 
Malloy) a defendant must pay no penalty for the exercise of the right to 
remain silent. This suggestion, however, is belied by the actual emphasis in 
both Carter and Griffin of the purported severity of the penalty represented 
by adverse comment. More importantly, the implication that an exercise of 
the privilege against self-incrimination must be totally “cost free” has been 
roundly rejected in the Court’s other Fifth Amendment jurisprudence.84
As noted above, the “no penalty” rhetoric animating Griffin and Carter
can be traced to Malloy v. Hogan, a case where, oddly enough, compulsion 
was not at issue. The petitioner in Malloy easily satisfied the compulsion 
hurdle as he was jailed for refusing to answer questions in a government 
inquiry.85 The Supreme Court promptly employed the Malloy dicta in 
Brooks v. Tennessee where it invalidated one of the mildest penalties 
pressures to testify amount to compulsion.”); Lissa Griffin, supra note 12, at 956 (noting 
that the Fifth Amendment “prohibits compulsion” and “in the no-comment situation, the 
defendant is not being compelled to testify at all”); Sampsell-Jones, supra note 9, at 1347 
(“The threat of an adverse inference, which is after all a relatively trivial penalty 
compared to torture or contempt, does not constitute compulsion.”); cf. Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1457, 1485 (1997) 
(arguing that Griffin is “wrong” in finding compulsion in adverse comment because the 
Fifth Amendment “privilege is violated if (and only if) judicial process compels the 
defendant to testify against himself or else go to jail for contempt” and “it does not follow 
that permitting the prosecutor to comment on a defendant’s choice not to testify, and 
permitting the trier of fact to draw reasonable inferences therefrom, is compulsory 
process requiring the defendant to be a witness”).
83 See infra Part II.A. 
84 “It is well settled that the government need not make the exercise of the Fifth 
Amendment privilege cost free.” McKune, 536 U.S. at 41 (plurality opinion). 
85 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 512–13 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing majority for ignoring compulsion requirement, but accepting as a given that 
sanctions such as “jail or torture” would constitute compulsion under the Fifth 
Amendment); Paulsen, supra note 82, at 1485 (contending that Griffin is flawed because 
the Fifth Amendment “privilege is violated if (and only if) judicial process compels the 
defendant to testify against himself or else go to jail for contempt”). 
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fathomable on the right to remain silent—a state law that required the 
defendant to testify first of all the witnesses in the defense case. 86 The Court 
creatively struck down the Tennessee law because, by precluding defendant 
testimony later on in the defense case, the law “exacts a price” for the 
defendant’s initial silence (i.e., not testifying first) and thus “casts a heavy 
burden on a defendant’s otherwise unconditional right not to take the 
stand.”87 Despite its fairly frequent appearances in the case law, Malloy’s “no 
penalty” language wildly overstates the Fifth Amendment’s protections, 
appearing more often in the harangues of dissenters than as a guiding 
principle for Fifth Amendment decisions. As the Court has consistently 
emphasized, “the Constitution does not forbid ‘every government-imposed 
choice in the criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise 
of constitutional rights.’”88 There is always a question of degree.89
In fact, both before and after Malloy, the Supreme Court has upheld, 
against Fifth Amendment challenge, government-imposed “penalties” upon a 
defendant’s exercise of his right to silence. For example, in 
McGautha v. California, the Court rejected a Fifth Amendment challenge to 
a unitary death penalty trial, even though the nature of the trial forced the 
defendant to either testify in the guilt phase of the trial, or forego the 
opportunity to personally seek clemency in the penalty phase.90 Indeed the 
procedure in McGautha is a direct analogue to that invalidated in Brooks. In 
86 Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 610–11 (1972). 
87 Id. Twenty-eight years later, a very different Supreme Court majority would seize 
upon the holding of Brooks to support its ruling that if a defendant did, in fact, testify 
after the other witnesses (the option Brooks mandates), the prosecution could argue to the 
jury that the defendant’s testimony should be disregarded as predictably tailored to the 
testimony that came before. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 70 (2000). 
88 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236 (1980) (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 
412 U.S. 17, 30 (1978)). 
89 See McKune, 536 U.S. at 41 (plurality opinion) (“Determining what constitutes 
unconstitutional compulsion involves a question of judgment: Courts must decide 
whether the consequences of [a] choice to remain silent are closer to the physical torture 
against which the Constitution clearly protects or the de minimis harms against which it 
does not.”); id. at 49 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The text of the Fifth Amendment does 
not prohibit all penalties levied in response to a person’s refusal to incriminate himself or 
herself . . . . [S]ome penalties are so great as to ‘compe[l]’ [a defendant’s] testimony, 
while others do not rise to that level.” (citations omitted)). 
90 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971) (summarizing the argument as 
follows: “the single-verdict procedure unlawfully compels the defendant to become a 
witness against himself on the issue of guilt by the threat of sentencing him to death 
without having heard from him”). 
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both cases, the defendant was required to make a tactical decision about 
whether to remain silent at an early point in the proceedings on pain of 
foregoing the right to speak at a later one.91 In both cases, an initial choice to 
remain silent is penalized. Nevertheless, as a majority of the Court would 
later note in describing McGautha’s holding, even though “the free exercise 
of [the defendant’s] Fifth Amendment right to remain silent was ‘chilled’ by 
the prospect that a harsher jury sentence might ensue,” the McGautha “Court 
did not agree . . . that the burden imposed on that right was impermissible.”92
In Baxter v. Palmigiano, the Court upheld against Fifth Amendment 
challenge the same penalty for silence that it prohibited in Griffin, albeit in a 
different context.93 Emphasizing the unique challenges of prison 
administration, the Court in Baxter permitted correctional authorities 
adjudicating disciplinary infractions to draw an adverse inference from a 
prisoner’s silence.94 It was the dissent in that case, not the majority, 
emphasizing the language from Malloy that a person must “‘suffer no 
penalty’” for invoking the right to remain silent.95 As Justice Kennedy would 
later point out in extending Baxter, “[t]he inmate . . . no doubt felt compelled 
91 Id. at 217 (“We conclude that the policies of the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination are not offended when a defendant in a capital case yields to the pressure to 
testify on the issue of punishment at the risk of damaging his case on guilt.”). The dissent 
in Brooks emphasized, without answer from the majority, that “the ‘choice’ we sustained 
in McGautha was far more difficult than that here, as the procedure there clearly exerted 
considerable force to compel the defendant to waive the privilege and take the stand in 
order to avoid the possible imposition of the death penalty.’” Brooks, 406 U.S. at 615 
(Burger, J., dissenting). 
92 Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 31; cf. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999) 
(concluding that use of silence to draw an adverse factual inference at sentencing 
constitutes “an impermissible burden on the exercise of the constitutional right against 
compelled self-incrimination” (italics added)); Poulin, supra note 10, at 205 (recognizing 
Griffin as an example of “the impermissible-burden approach” to the Fifth Amendment). 
93 425 U.S. 308, 319 (1976). 
94 Id. at 317–18; see also Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 288
(1998) (permitting adverse inference from defendant’s silence in state clemency 
hearings). 
95 Baxter, 425 U.S. at 326 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Malloy 
v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)); see also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 436 n.7 
(1984) (“[N]othing in the Federal Constitution would prevent a State from revoking 
probation for a refusal to answer that violated an express condition of probation or from 
using the probationer’s silence as ‘one of a number of factors to be considered by a finder 
of fact’ in deciding whether other conditions of probation have been violated.” (quoting 
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 808 n.5 (1977))). 
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to speak in one sense of the word,” but the Baxter Court “nevertheless 
rejected the inmate’s self-incrimination claim.”96
In McKune v. Lile, the Supreme Court rejected a Fifth Amendment 
challenge to a state program that rewarded inmates convicted of certain sex 
crimes if they agreed, inter alia, to complete a form detailing “all prior sexual 
activities” including uncharged criminal offenses.97 The Court recognized 
that prisoners who refused to participate on the grounds of self-incrimination 
were, in effect, penalized for the exercise of their right to remain silent, but 
(after cataloguing the various analogous penalties for protected silence that it 
had upheld in other contexts) deemed the penalty insufficiently severe to 
constitute the compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment.98
A case that arose decades before both Malloy and Griffin,
Raffel v. United States,99 provides yet another example. In Raffel, the 
Supreme Court permitted a testifying defendant to be impeached in a second 
trial by the fact that he had declined to testify in his first trial (the first trial 
resulted in a mistrial).100 The Court explained, “having once cast aside the 
cloak of immunity, he may not resume it at will, whenever cross-examination 
may be inconvenient or embarrassing.”101 The more recent case of Jenkins v. 
Anderson reaffirmed the principle established in Raffel, holding that a 
prosecutor could impeach the credibility of a testifying defendant with his 
96 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 38 (plurality opinion); see Clymer, supra note 12, 
at 1378 (reading Baxter as concluding that “the threat to draw the inference . . . was not 
sufficient ‘compulsion’ to trigger the Fifth Amendment privilege” and suggesting that a 
similar approach could be applied in police officer disciplinary investigations). 
Baxter also established that Griffin’s prohibition of adverse inferences from trial 
silence does not apply in civil cases, allowing a civil defendant to be penalized for 
exercising the privilege. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318 (“[T]he Fifth Amendment does not 
forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in 
response to probative evidence offered against them.”); see also Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 328 
(recognizing as “‘the prevailing rule’” that “‘the Fifth Amendment does not forbid 
adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response 
to probative evidence offered against them’”); Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 523 U.S. at 286 
(stating that a judicial body may draw an adverse inference from silence “in a civil 
proceeding without offending the Fifth Amendment”). 
97 536 U.S. at 30 (plurality opinion). 
98 Id. at 42. 
99 271 U.S. 494 (1926). 
100 Id. at 496–97. 
101 Id. at 497. 
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silence prior to arrest.102 The Court, again invoking a cloak metaphor, 
explained that the impeachment “follows the defendant’s own decision to 
cast aside his cloak of silence and advances the truth-finding function of the 
criminal trial.”103 In both Raffel and Jenkins, the defendant suffered a penalty 
at trial for exercising his constitutionally protected right to remain silent in a 
previous setting (in Jenkins, the Court assumed, without deciding, that 
prearrest silence could be construed as “an invocation of the [Fifth 
Amendment] right to remain silent”).104 The Supreme Court, nevertheless, 
held that the penalty did not violate the Fifth Amendment. 
Perhaps the most compelling rebuttal to the suggestion that the state may 
not pressure (ex ante) or penalize (ex post) defendants who decline to 
incriminate themselves can be found in the practice of plea bargaining. 
Under this widespread practice, the state bargains for a defendant’s 
admission of guilt by reducing the charges, agreeing to a sentencing cap or 
even promising leniency for a third party, such as a spouse.105 Any 
102 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 241 (1980); see Poulin, supra note 10, at 198 
(recognizing “apparent conflict” between reasoning of Griffin and Raffel). 
103 Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 238. 
104 Id. at 236 n.2. The defendant in Jenkins claimed that he had killed in self-
defense; the prosecutor argued that his claim was not credible because the defendant did 
not report the incident to police prior to his arrest. Id. at 234–35.  
The Supreme Court has held that “because Miranda warnings inform a person of his 
right to remain silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his silence will not be used 
against him,” the Due Process Clause forbids impeaching a defendant who remains silent 
after being given Miranda warnings with his pretrial, post-Miranda silence. Anderson v. 
Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 407–08 (1980); see also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) 
(setting forth the rule). But cf. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 74–75 (2000) (noting 
that “there might be reason to reconsider Doyle” but declining to do so and explaining the 
reasoning of that case on the ground that “[i]t is possible to believe that [the Miranda
warnings given to the defendant in that case] contained an implicit promise that his 
choice of the option of silence would not be used against him”). Even if this authority 
were read to raise a due process obstacle to adverse comment on trial silence, it would 
not conflict with the argument posited in this Article because if the constitutional 
prohibition were tailored as described herein, the defendant would be informed (either 
through counsel or by the court) prior to declining to testify that his trial silence could be 
the subject of adverse comment and inference. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 408; see also 
infra Part IV.C (“Doyle bars the use against a criminal defendant of silence maintained 
after receipt of governmental assurances.”) 
105 See United States v. Marquez, 909 F.2d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1990) (cataloguing 
cases where courts upheld plea agreements that involved a promise of lenity to a third 
party); Jacqueline E. Ross, The Entrenched Position of Plea Bargaining in United States 
Legal Practice, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 717, 732 n.85 (2006) (recognizing that pleas can 
involve promises of lenity for spouse or family members); cf. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 
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significant offer by the state in this context places tremendous pressure on a 
defendant not only to abandon the privilege against self-incrimination, but to 
formally and conclusively admit guilt. (In the most extreme instance, a 
defendant may plead guilty to a serious criminal charge to avoid the death 
penalty.) Such an admission, by allowing the state to convict “without 
evidence from another source,” forms a compelling analogue to the historical 
practices the Fifth Amendment was designed to prevent.106 The Court has 
nevertheless consistently held that the government may pressure a defendant 
to incriminate himself in this manner and, if the defendant declines to 
acquiesce, penalize him by pursuing the more serious charges and higher 
penalties that would have been abandoned had the defendant pled guilty.107
434 U.S. 357, 365 (1978) (recognizing that such promises implicate the voluntariness of 
such pleas, but not explicitly ruling on their permissibility). It has been estimated that 
over ninety-five percent of criminal cases are resolved by plea bargains. See JENIA I.
TURNER, PLEA BARGAINING ACROSS BORDERS 10 (Aspen 2009) (summarizing plea 
bargaining regime in the United States and noting that by 2004, “more than 95 percent of 
convictions in federal court and a similar number in state systems were resolved through 
no-contest or guilty pleas”); Ross, supra, at 717 (summarizing statistics released by the 
federal department of justice that “[i]n the criminal justice systems of the 50 states, over 
95% of all criminal cases are disposed of without a trial, through the entry of a guilty 
plea” and “[i]n the federal system the percentage of bargained-for convictions is even 
higher”). 
106 See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988) (“Historically, the privilege 
was intended to prevent the use of legal compulsion to extract from the accused a sworn 
communication of facts which would incriminate him. Such was the process of the 
ecclesiastical courts and the Star Chamber—the inquisitorial method of putting the 
accused upon his oath and compelling him to answer questions designed to uncover 
uncharged offenses, without evidence from another source.”); Langbein, supra note 9, at 
12–19 (analogizing medieval law regarding torture to modern American practice of plea 
bargaining). 
107 See McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 41–42 (2002) (plurality opinion) (“The Court 
likewise has held that plea bargaining does not violate the Fifth Amendment, even though 
criminal defendants may feel considerable pressure to admit guilt in order to obtain more 
lenient treatment.”); Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364 (“While confronting a defendant 
with the risk of more severe punishment clearly may have a ‘discouraging effect on the 
defendant’s assertion of his trial rights, the imposition of these difficult choices [is] an 
inevitable’—and permissible—‘attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and 
encourages the negotiation of pleas.’” (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 31 
(1973))); Chaffin, 412 U.S. at 30 (recognizing that “[i]n Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 
742 (1970), Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970), and North Carolina v. 
Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), defendants entered pleas of guilty in order to avoid the 
potential imposition of death sentences by a jury,” and despite the fact that each 
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Thus, the case law demonstrates that the oft-repeated Malloy dicta 
celebrating “the right of a person to remain silent unless he chooses to speak 
in the unfettered exercise of his own will” and “to suffer no penalty . . . for 
such silence” cannot be taken literally.108 Contrary to Malloy, and the 
implication in Griffin and Carter, the mere existence of some pressure on the 
right to remain silent, whether state-sponsored or not, does not violate the 
Fifth Amendment.109
B. A Nuanced Approach to Adverse Comment: United States v. 
 Robinson 
Given the case law summarized in the preceding section, it should come 
as no surprise that the Court’s flexible approach to penalties imposed on 
Fifth Amendment silence appears even in the Court’s few examinations of 
adverse comment since Griffin and Carter. In United States v. Robinson,
defense counsel contended in closing argument that the government had not 
let the defendant explain certain incriminating circumstances.110 The 
prosecutor rejoined in rebuttal argument that the defendant “could have taken 
the stand and explained it to you.”111 The Supreme Court recognized that the 
prosecutor’s argument violated the pronouncement “in Griffin to the effect 
that the Fifth Amendment ‘forbids . . . comment by the prosecution on the 
accused’s silence.’”112 In addition, the prosecutor’s comments constituted a 
penalty for silence, imposing “some ‘cost’ to the defendant in having 
remained silent.”113 Nevertheless, the Court declined to interpret Griffin to 
defendant “was dissuaded from exercising his rights to a jury trial and to plead not 
guilty,” the “Court found no constitutional infirmity”). 
108 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964); cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 
509 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the language in many of the opinions” 
in the self-incrimination context “overstates the actual course of decision” and citing 
Malloy as an example). 
109 See Poulin, supra note 10, at 205–06 (recognizing in examining Griffin and 
related cases that “[t]he Court has permitted the government to attach some negative 
consequences to the exercise of a constitutional right”); Snyder, supra note 9, at 288–89 
(noting that the Supreme Court only prohibits certain “impermissible burden[s]” on the 
privilege, not all burdens). 
110 485 U.S. 25, 26 (1988). 
111 Id. at 28.  
112 Id. at 33 (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965)). 
113 Id. at 34. 
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“preclude a fair response by the prosecutor in situations such as the present 
one.”114
Robinson relied on an earlier case, Lockett v. Ohio, which held that a 
state prosecutor’s repeated comments that the government’s evidence was 
“unrefuted” and “uncontradicted” did not violate the rule announced in 
Griffin even though the comments, arguably, invited an inference of guilt 
from the defendant’s trial silence. Rather than inflexibly applying the Malloy
dicta, the Court in Lockett emphasized the various aspects of the case that 
minimized the penalty involved, principally that “the prosecutor’s closing 
remarks added nothing to the impression that had already been created by 
[the defendant’s] refusal to testify after the jury had been promised a defense 
by her lawyer and told that [the defendant] would take the stand.”115
Although downplayed in those opinions, the underlying principle applied 
in Lockett and Robinson—that adverse comment is not always an 
impermissible burden on defendant silence—is compelled by both the 
Court’s general Fifth Amendment jurisprudence and the Fifth Amendment’s 
text. Despite the Court’s protestations to the contrary, this principle cannot 
properly be viewed as an isolated exception to Griffin’s constitutional rule; 
rather, the principle faithfully reflects the Fifth Amendment text and must be 
applied more broadly. 
114 Id.; see also id. at 32 (“[W]here as in this case the prosecutor’s reference to the 
defendant’s opportunity to testify is a fair response to a claim made by defendant or his 
counsel, we think there is no violation of the privilege.”). Justice Marshall dissented, 
noting that “[a]s the Court itself recognizes, . . . the comments in this case imposed a 
penalty on respondent for his decision not to take the stand” and ran afoul of the Court’s 
pronouncements that “‘a criminal defendant is guaranteed the right “to remain silent 
unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no 
penalty . . . for such silence.”’” Robinson, 485 U.S. at 45 (quoting Estelle v. Smith, 451 
U.S. 454, 467–68 (1981)). Justice Marshall asserted that the considerations relied on by 
the majority to conclude there was no constitutional violation merely informed the 
question of whether the violation was harmless and emphasized that “whether a 
prosecutorial comment imposes a cost on a defendant’s assertion of his Fifth Amendment 
privilege is not necessarily related to whether the comment is a response to the defense.” 
Id. at 41 n.3, 44 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
115 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595 (1978). Along these same lines, the Court has 
permitted adverse inference and instruction when a defendant testifies, but fails to fully 
rebut the prosecution’s evidence. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 494 (1917) 
(“[W]here the accused takes the stand in his own behalf and voluntarily testifies for 
himself . . . he may not stop short in his testimony by omitting and failing to explain 
incriminating circumstances and events already in evidence, in which he participated and 
concerning which he is fully informed, without subjecting his silence to the inferences to 
be naturally drawn from it.”). 
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C. Adverse Comment Generally Creates Only Minimal Pressure to 
 Testify
Perhaps the most striking analytical flaw in Griffin’s uniform prohibition 
of adverse comment on defendant trial silence is the Court’s failure to 
acknowledge that adverse comment is not always as severe a penalty as it 
was in Griffin itself. In fact, as other commentators have recognized, as a 
general matter, adverse comment constitutes a minimal burden on defendant 
silence. 
Whether or not adverse prosecutorial or judicial comment is permitted, 
and irrespective of any judicial instruction to the contrary,116 the defendant 
always suffers a “penalty” for declining to take the witness stand—the 
likelihood that jurors will notice the failure to testify and discount the 
probability of innocence accordingly. This inherent pressure to testify, 
however, does not constitute compulsion under the Fifth Amendment. As the 
Supreme Court has explained: “Introduction of any evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, tending to implicate the defendant in the alleged crime 
increases the pressure on him to testify. The mere massing of evidence 
against a defendant cannot be regarded as a violation of his privilege against 
self-incrimination.”117
116 United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 515 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“[A] defendant’s election not to testify ‘is almost certain to prejudice the defense no 
matter what else happens in the court room.’” (quoting United States v. Davis, 437 F.2d 
928, 933 (7th Cir. 1971))); Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 499 (1926) (“We need 
not close our eyes to the fact that every person accused of crime is under some pressure 
to testify, lest the jury, despite carefully framed instructions, draw an unfavorable 
inference from his silence.”); Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 57 (“[J]urors are likely to 
weigh a defendant’s silence whatever they are told.”); Stone, supra note 9, at 147 n.241 
(noting that because “the jury will always be aware of defendant’s silence at trial, even if 
no instruction is given, . . . the penalty in Griffin consists only of the additional impact of 
the prohibited instruction”). 
117 Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 847 (1973) (rejecting argument that 
common-law presumption of guilty knowledge from possession of recently stolen goods 
violates the privilege against self-incrimination); see also Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. 
Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 287 (1998) (recognizing that in many circumstances, “there are 
undoubted pressures—generated by the strength of the government’s case against him—
pushing the criminal defendant to testify,” but “it has never been suggested that such 
pressures constitute ‘compulsion’ for Fifth Amendment purposes”); McGautha v. 
California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971) (plurality opinion) (“It is not contended, nor could it 
be successfully, that the mere force of evidence is compulsion of the sort forbidden by the 
privilege.”); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83–84 (1970) (“The defendant in a 
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Once the inherent pressure to testify created by the massing of 
prosecution evidence is subtracted from the calculus, it becomes difficult to 
argue that the artificial (i.e., court-sponsored) pressure generated by adverse 
comment and instruction increases the pressure to testify to a degree that 
amounts to compulsion to testify.118 Indeed, Carter itself explicitly asserts 
that the penalty that arises without adverse comment “may be just as severe” 
as the penalty that arises when adverse comment is permitted.119
The Court’s recognition of the primacy of the constitutionally benign 
pressure to testify that arises solely from the evidence explains the otherwise 
anomalous holding of Barnes v. United States.120 In Barnes, the Supreme 
Court rejected a Fifth Amendment challenge to a jury instruction that “an 
inference of guilty knowledge may be drawn from the fact of unexplained
possession of stolen goods.”121 The Court acknowledged that “the practical 
effect” of the instruction is to shift the burden of proving innocence to the 
criminal trial is frequently forced to testify himself and to call other witnesses in an effort 
to reduce the risk of conviction.”). 
Griffin itself implicitly recognized this point, taking pains to distinguish the penalty 
inherent in remaining silent from adverse prosecutorial or judicial comment, which is a 
“penalty imposed by courts.” Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (explaining 
that “[w]hat the jury may infer, given no help from the court” is a separate concern from 
“[w]hat it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence 
against him”); see also Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 301 (1981) (stating that “a 
defendant must pay no court-imposed price for the exercise of his constitutional privilege 
not to testify” (emphasis added)). 
118 Ayer, supra note 6, at 863 (“[T]he pressure to testify that the Griffin Court 
termed a ‘penalty’ is really an incidental product of ‘the force of circumstances’ and the 
weight of the evidence.”); Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 53 n.130 (arguing that “the 
prospect of modest adverse comment by the judge is not likely to have great impact on 
the defendant’s choice [as to whether or not to testify], particularly in light of the ability 
of his own counsel to provide an explanation why he has not testified”); Poulin, supra
note 10, at 210 (noting that because “[t]he jury observes the defendant’s failure to testify 
at trial even if neither the prosecutor nor the judge comments on that silence, . . . only a 
slight additional burden arises when the judge or prosecutor is permitted to comment”); 
Strauss, supra note 12, at 156 (acknowledging that the penalty identified in Griffin is 
minimal because “even without prosecutorial comment, a suspect knows that the jury is 
obviously aware of whether or not he or she takes the stand” and the “defendant thus 
already must include in his calculation whether remaining silent impacts the jury”); cf.
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 385 (1990) (“[T]he arguments of counsel, like the 
instructions of the court, must be judged in the context in which they are made.”). 
119 Carter, 450 U.S. at 301. 
120 412 U.S. 837 (1973). 
121 See id. at 843 (emphasis added). 
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defendant.122 When the defendant is the only person who can rebut the stated 
inference by explaining his possession of stolen goods (as will often be the 
case), the conclusion is also unavoidable that the instruction, like that in 
Griffin, pressures the defendant to testify by rendering a decision not to do so 
more “costly.”123 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Barnes, affirming the 
validity of a long line of cases upholding similar instructions, held that this 
pressure arises primarily from the evidence, and so does not violate the 
privilege against self-incrimination.124
The critical point implicit in Barnes (and ignored in Griffin) is that 
adverse comment or instruction has little inherent force. It relies for its effect 
on the state of the evidence in any particular case. In some cases, the 
evidence demands a response. If the evidence establishes the defendant’s 
presence at the crime scene (Griffin) or possession of stolen items (Barnes), a 
defendant is virtually compelled to provide some explanation regardless of 
whether the prosecutor (or court) highlights its absence. Defendant silence in 
the face of such evidence is, as they say, deafening. On the other hand, when 
the defense forcefully rebuts the prosecution case without reliance on the 
defendant’s testimony (either by exposing flaws in the government case 
through cross-examination or by presenting affirmative evidence), there is 
little pressure to take the stand.125 For example, if the defense is able to put 
on a compelling alibi witness or to wholly discredit the prosecution’s 
eyewitness, the prosecutor’s harping on the absence of the defendant’s own 
testimony will come across as an act of desperation.126
122 Id. at 846 n.11. 
123 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965). 
124 Barnes, 412 U.S. at 846 (citing Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 417–18 
(1970); Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178, 185 (1925)); see also United States v. 
Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 70–71 (1965) (holding that instruction that the jury could infer 
defendant’s complicity in illegal distillery operation from his unexplained presence at the 
still would not be “fairly understood as a comment on the petitioner’s failure to testify” 
because “[t]he judge’s overall reference was carefully directed to the evidence as a 
whole”). 
125 Cf. Parker v. State, 39 A. 651, 654 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1898) (“There may be cases in 
which the evidence against the accused does not directly affect him, and a reply from him 
could not necessarily be expected. His failure to offer himself as a witness when his 
testimony could not meet or disprove any particular fact or circumstance, and could only 
consist of a general denial of guilt, probably ought not to affect him, and, if so, his silence 
should not be commented on or considered.”). 
126 This is particularly true if the rule permitting adverse comment mandates an 
instruction, as did California’s pre-Griffin rule, that the failure of a defendant to testify 
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In sum, given the inherent power of the government’s evidence to 
compel testimony (and the relative inability of argument and instruction to 
achieve that same result), the conclusion is unavoidable that the greater part 
of the pressure to testify contemplated in Griffin arises from the evidence in a 
particular case, not adverse comment or instruction on a defendant’s refusal 
to testify. Carter itself concedes as much. It is only when the prosecution 
evidence remains unshaken by the other tools available to the defense and 
demonstrates the defendant’s knowledge of key facts in dispute, that the 
defendant’s failure to testify becomes an irresistible subject for (adverse) 
juror speculation. Even when this occurs, however, adverse comment and 
instruction, or the lack thereof, play only a marginal role in the defendant’s 
decision to testify. While certainly one factor in the tactical calculus, the 
pressure of adverse comment in these circumstances cannot, absent some 
additional consideration, be equated with the compulsion necessary to trigger 
a Fifth Amendment violation. 
III. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE FIFTH AMENDMENT PROHIBITION OF 
ADVERSE COMMENT
While the Supreme Court has never explicitly repudiated Malloy’s no-
penalty dicta, the Justices have acknowledged the subtle and subjective 
balancing act that lies at the core of their Fifth Amendment penalty 
jurisprudence. Concurring in McKune, Justice O’Connor candidly 
summarized the jurisprudence as follows: “The text of the Fifth Amendment 
does not prohibit all penalties levied in response to a person’s refusal to 
incriminate himself or herself . . . . [S]ome penalties are so great as to 
‘compe[l]’ [a defendant’s] testimony, while others do not rise to that 
level.”127 Justice Kennedy echoed these sentiments, writing for four other 
justices in the same case: “Determining what constitutes unconstitutional 
cannot make up for a failure of proof in the prosecution case. See Griffin, 380 U.S. at 622 
(Stewart, J., dissenting); People v. Adamson, 165 P.2d 3, 9–10 (Cal. 1946). 
127 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 49 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); 
see Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805 (1977) (“[O]ur cases have established 
that a State may not impose substantial penalties because a witness elects to exercise his 
Fifth Amendment right not to give incriminating testimony against himself.” (emphasis 
added)); cf. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 437 (1984) (emphasizing in rejecting 
Fifth Amendment challenge that “there is no reasonable basis for concluding that 
Minnesota attempted to attach an impermissible penalty to the exercise of the privilege 
against self-incrimination” (emphasis added)); United States v. Antelope, 395 F.3d 1128, 
1135 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[A]n individual choosing silence does not get a free pass against 
all possible repercussions.”). 
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compulsion involves a question of judgment: Courts must decide whether the 
consequences of [a] choice to remain silent are closer to the physical torture 
against which the Constitution clearly protects or the de minimis harms 
against which it does not.”128 These acknowledgements of the inherent 
subjectivity of Fifth Amendment penalty jurisprudence, while refreshing in 
their candor, merely frame the inquiry. The far more difficult task is 
identifying precisely what differentiates the penalties upon protected silence 
that are sufficiently severe to be forbidden by the Fifth Amendment.129
As discussed in Part I, supra, the Supreme Court sidestepped this 
difficulty in Griffin and Carter by implying that any pressure, however mild, 
violates the Fifth Amendment. As we have seen, both the Fifth Amendment 
text and the Court’s own case law refute this proposition. Further, as 
explained in Part II.C, supra, as a general matter, adverse comment 
constitutes only a mild penalty for trial silence. 
The analysis in the preceding sections does not, however, compel the 
conclusion that the Fifth Amendment prohibition of adverse comment must 
be scrapped entirely. As this section will explain, an alternative rationale for 
the prohibition exists. In fact, a robust justification for a narrow 
constitutional prohibition of adverse comment can be drawn out of both the 
constitutional text and the existing Supreme Court case law. 
As already alluded to, Griffin and Carter are amenable to a more 
nuanced interpretation than has thus far been adopted by the courts and 
commentators. While Griffin was decided less than a year after Malloy, the 
opinion does not rely solely on Malloy’s no-penalty rhetoric. Instead, the 
Griffin Court took pains to emphasize that adverse comment was not merely 
punitive, but unfairly so because the inference of guilt from silence is “not 
always . . . natural or irresistible.”130 The reliance on a fairness paradigm 
128 McKune, 536 U.S. at 41 (plurality opinion). 
129 Justice O’Connor, in McKune, criticized her colleagues’ “failure to set forth a 
comprehensive theory of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” Id.
at 53–54 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment); see also Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 
288, 310 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticizing “[t]he concept of ‘burdens’ and 
‘penalties’” as “a vague one”); Ayer, supra note 6, at 854 (“[N]o simple rule exists to sort 
permissible from impermissible burdens on constitutional rights.”); Strauss, supra note 
12, at 155 (“Of course, not all burdens on the exercise of a right constitute an 
unconstitutional penalty. The question then becomes: When is a burden impermissible? 
There does not appear to be a clear answer to this question.”). 
130 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 615. As the discussion in the text indicates, a perceived 
narrowing of Griffin cannot be rested solely at the feet of personnel changes in the 
Supreme Court. See Joseph L. Hoffmann et al., Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of Death,
69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313, 2375–76 (2001) (arguing that “the current [Rehnquist] Court 
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reappears in Carter where the Court stated that permitting the jury to draw an 
inference of guilt from silence is often misleading because “there are many 
reasons unrelated to guilt or innocence for declining to testify.”131 A related 
(although not identical) fairness rationale is again implicit in the cloak 
metaphors employed in Raffel and Jenkins, where the defendant’s figurative 
abandonment of his “cloak of silence” opened the door to the prosecutor’s 
use of otherwise protected silence as impeachment.132 As discussed above, 
Robinson and Lockett explicitly rely on a fairness paradigm in permitting 
otherwise forbidden adverse comment.133
Although the Supreme Court has never taken this step, the unfairness 
intuition repeatedly invoked in its case law can be placed within a doctrinal 
framework to answer the otherwise devastating criticism (discussed in Part 
II, supra) that adverse comment does not amount to compulsion. This 
approach would emphasize that it is the unfairness of adverse comment, in 
certain cases, that aggravates the comment’s severity as a penalty, causing it 
to become an analogue to the forbidden compulsion to testify. Adopting 
Justice O’Connor and Justice Kennedy’s respective characterizations of the 
question, the unfairness of adverse comment is precisely what makes it a 
penalty “so great as to ‘compe[l]’” 134 defendant testimony, and what places 
views Griffin as a due process ‘fundamental fairness’ case, rather than a penumbral Fifth 
Amendment case” and that this “shift in rationale, if it is confirmed in future cases, would 
further limit the scope of Griffin, since it would mean that only ‘fundamentally unfair’ 
burdens on constitutional rights would be prohibited”). The groundwork for narrowing 
Griffin’s prohibition to cases involving unfairness can be found in Griffin itself, as well 
as earlier cases. 
131 Carter, 450 U.S. at 300 n.15; see also Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 67 
(2000) (emphasizing that “[a] defendant might refuse to testify simply out of fear that he 
will be made to look bad by clever counsel, or fear that his prior convictions will 
prejudice the jury”); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 611–12 (1972) (noting that there 
are “very real and legitimate concerns that might motivate a defendant to exercise his 
right of silence” and that compelling a defendant to testify first or not at all “may compel 
even a wholly truthful defendant, who might otherwise decline to testify for legitimate 
reasons, to subject himself to impeachment and cross-examination at a time when the 
strength of his other evidence is not yet clear”). 
132 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) (allowing impeachment with 
protected silence because it “follows the defendant’s own decision to cast aside his cloak 
of silence and advances the truth-finding function of the criminal trial”); Raffel v. United 
States, 271 U.S. 494, 497 (1926) (“[H]aving once cast aside the cloak of immunity, [the 
defendant] may not resume it at will, whenever cross-examination may be inconvenient 
or embarrassing.”). 
133 See supra Part II.B. 
134 McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 49 (2002) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). 
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the penalty incurred by silence “closer to the physical torture against which 
the Constitution clearly protects” than to “the de minimis harms against 
which it does not.”135
The dilemma of the defendant with prior convictions best illustrates this 
effect. Many defendants, like the defendants in both Griffin and Carter, are 
clearly motivated to remain silent at trial to avoid impeachment with criminal 
convictions. The defendant in Griffin, on trial for a murder committed during 
an attempted rape, would have been impeached (had he testified) with a prior 
rape conviction and a felony conviction for being a “‘sexually dangerous 
person.’”136 The defendant in Carter, on trial for burglarizing a store, 
avoided impeachment with prior convictions for store burglary and receipt of 
stolen property.137 Clearly an adverse inference from silence in these 
circumstances—i.e., the suggestion that the defendant’s silence reflects 
guilt—is unwarranted and unfair. The defendant’s silence is, in no way, 
indicative of guilt.138 It reflects only the fear that the jury will leap to a 
135 Id. at 41 (plurality opinion); see also Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 77 (Ginsburg, with 
Souter, JJ., dissenting) (suggesting that the rule in Griffin “stem[s] from the principle that 
where the exercise of constitutional rights is ‘insolubly ambiguous’ as between innocence 
and guilt . . . a prosecutor may not unfairly encumber those rights by urging the jury to 
construe the ambiguity against the defendant” (emphasis added)). 
136 See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 3, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) 
(No. 202), 1964 WL 81335; see also People v. Griffin, 383 P.2d 432, 437 (Cal. 1963) 
(“Implicit in the verdict of the jury was a finding that the killing was committed during an 
attempted rape.”). 
137 See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 2–3, Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288
(1981) (No. 80-5060), 1980 WL 339742. Carter’s prior convictions for “Storehouse 
Breaking” and “Knowingly Receiving Stolen Property Over $100.00” were less serious 
than Griffin’s prior convictions, but equally prejudicial in the context of the case, 
considering that Carter was charged with burglarizing a store. See id.
138 One might contend that the existence of the criminal record demonstrates the 
defendant’s general criminal propensities and thus does support an inference of guilt after 
all. For purposes of American criminal trials, however, this line of reasoning has long 
been rejected. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475–76 (1948) (explaining 
that evidence of the defendant’s “prior trouble with the law” is excluded not “because [it] 
is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so 
overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a bad general record and deny him a fair 
opportunity to defend against a particular charge”); FED. R. EVID. 404 (“Evidence of 
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order 
to show action in conformity therewith.”). Thus, when a trial court admits evidence of a 
testifying defendant’s prior convictions as impeachment, it must then instruct the jury 
that the evidence cannot be considered as substantive evidence of guilt. See Jeffrey 
Bellin, Circumventing Congress: How the Federal Courts Opened the Door to 
Impeaching Criminal Defendants with Prior Convictions, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 289, 
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legally prohibited conclusion of guilt when it learns of the defendant’s 
criminal record. Indeed, the urging of an adverse inference from silence in 
these circumstances appears to violate a basic postulate of the justice 
system—the prosecutor and court would be suggesting that the jury convict 
based on an inference known to be false.139
Significantly, the unfairness of urging an adverse inference from silence 
when the defendant has prior convictions cannot be dispelled by evidence 
and argument. A defendant who declines to testify to hide his criminal record 
cannot, as a practical matter, explain his reason for failing to testify to the 
jury. Were the defendant to inform the jury of his prior convictions, it would 
defeat the very purpose of his refusal to testify. In essence, the defendant 
would be forced to incriminate himself to avoid self-incrimination.140
For the defendant with prior convictions, then, adverse comment is not 
simply the marginal reinforcement of a natural inference of guilt from silence 
discussed in Part II.C, supra. The defendant is threatened with a court-
sponsored and unrebuttable inference that (with the court and prosecutor’s 
full awareness) misleads the jury as to the actual reason for his silence. As a 
result of this unfairness, the penalty imposed by adverse comment is 
significantly more severe than exists in circumstances where either: (i) an 
adverse inference is fully consistent with the actual motivation for the 
defendant’s silence (and thus merely parallels and marginally reinforces an 
otherwise natural and irresistible inference); or (ii) when the inference is 
300 (2008) (discussing American courts’ reliance on limiting instructions to resolve the 
tension between the prohibition of prior crimes as propensity evidence and their 
admission as impeachment). 
139 See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972) (emphasizing that 
“deliberate deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is 
incompatible with ‘rudimentary demands of justice’” and the “‘same result obtains when 
the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it 
appears’”); United States v. Blueford, 312 F.3d 962, 968 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[I]t is 
decidedly improper for the government to propound inferences that it knows to be false, 
or has very strong reason to doubt.”); see also Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 
(1980) (“In determining whether a constitutional right has been burdened impermissibly, 
it also is appropriate to consider the legitimacy of the challenged governmental 
practice.”). In Griffin, the attorney for the petitioner argued that it “was misconduct by 
the prosecutor” to argue for an adverse inference “as he knew that the defendant had 
suffered prior convictions of a felony and that he would be seriously impeached and 
badly reflected upon before the jury.” Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 10, Griffin v. 
California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (No. 202), 1964 WL 81335. 
140 Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 334 (“Realistically, we cannot give the jury the full 
picture without creating the very prejudice to innocent defendants from which the 
privilege should shield them in the first place.”). 
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inconsistent with the defendant’s true motivation for silence, but that 
inconsistency can be brought before the jury. For the defendant with prior 
convictions, the penalty for silence can even be said to be so severe that it 
amounts to something on the order of compulsion.141
Thus, by emphasizing the fairness concerns that adverse comment 
imports into the Fifth Amendment penalty analysis (and are already 
highlighted in the governing case law), the courts can shore up the precarious 
constitutional footing of Griffin and its progeny. Adverse comment becomes 
an unconstitutional penalty upon a defendant’s silence when, as in Griffin
itself,142 the prosecutor or judge suggests the jury draw an unfair (i.e., 
counterfactual and unrebuttable) inference from protected silence. In all other 
circumstances, however, Griffin’s blanket prohibition of adverse comment is 
unwarranted.143
141 In a comment on Ayers, Professor Bradley briefly sketches an argument that is 
roughly analogous to the unfair penalty thesis posited here. See Bradley, supra note 76, at 
1296 (“[G]iven that there are a variety of reasons, totally consistent with innocence, that 
may impel one to exercise his fifth amendment right to silence, it flows that to allow the 
judge or prosecutor to tell the jury that such an exercise is evidence of guilt is not 
‘rational’ and should not be permitted. The drawing of an ‘irrational’ inference from the 
exercise of a constitutional right is clearly an impermissible burden.”). In contrast to this 
article’s thesis, however, Bradley suggests that this analysis provides a complete defense 
for the Griffin rule. See id. at 1298 (“[T]he [Griffin] rule is firmly rooted in a basic 
truism: There are many reasons apart from guilt—particularly fear of impeachment with 
prior convictions—that may cause a defendant, upon advice of counsel, to choose not to 
testify. To allow the prosecutor to argue that failure to testify is evidence of guilt is thus 
irrational and inconsistent with our traditional understanding of the fifth amendment 
privilege. Such argument is therefore an impermissible burden on the right of silence.”); 
cf. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 77 (2000) (Ginsburg, with Souter, JJ., dissenting) 
(suggesting that Griffin “stem[s] from the principle that where the exercise of 
constitutional rights is ‘insolubly ambiguous’ as between innocence and guilt . . . a 
prosecutor may not unfairly encumber those rights by urging the jury to construe the 
ambiguity against the defendant”). 
142 See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 3, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) 
(No. 202), 1964 WL 81335 (noting that the defendant in Griffin had previously been 
convicted of rape and being a “‘sexually dangerous person, a felony’”). 
143 In arguing for complete abolition of the Griffin rule, Sampsell-Jones nevertheless 
contends that “if a defendant declines to take the stand in order to avoid the prosecution’s 
use of other crimes for impeachment, the prosecution should not be able to argue that the 
defendant’s silence constitutes an admission” because “the defendant would not have an 
opportunity to explain his silence without revealing unfairly prejudicial information.” 
Sampsell-Jones, supra note 9, at 1356. Sampsell-Jones suggests that these protections 
could be implemented by statute as well as through “general principles of evidence law.” 
See id. There is no guarantee, however, that the delicate transition from constitutional to 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF A NARROWED PROHIBITION OF ADVERSE 
COMMENT
A recognition of the distinctive Fifth Amendment concerns raised by 
unfairly penalizing trial silence fortifies the prohibition of adverse comment 
against the doctrinal critiques noted at the outset of this article. At the same 
time, this recognition highlights the fact that the current prohibition, which 
protects all defendants who remain silent at trial regardless of the motivations 
for their silence, far outstrips any coherent Fifth Amendment rationale. 
Stated more precisely, if, as this article contends, a Fifth Amendment 
rationale for prohibiting adverse comment hinges on (i) eliminating unfair 
comment, that (ii) penalizes a Fifth Amendment refusal to incriminate 
oneself, the existing prohibition is erroneously protecting many defendants 
who either suffer no unfairness from adverse comment or who are silent for 
reasons unprotected by the Fifth Amendment. 
Focusing initially on unfairness, it is axiomatic that an inference of guilt 
from silence “is not always . . . natural or irresistible”144 and thus adverse 
comment is often unfair. It is equally clear, however, that such comment is 
not always unfair. Discouraging adverse comment in cases where an 
inference of guilt from silence is natural and irresistible makes little sense as 
an intuitive matter145 and, more significantly, cannot be supported by the 
unfairness rationale posited here as the sole doctrinally defensible 
justification for a Fifth Amendment prohibition of adverse comment. 
statutory protections that Sampsell-Jones envisions would take place. If Griffin’s 
constitutional rule is abolished (rather than more narrowly tailored as suggested here), the 
States would once again be permitted, as in pre-Griffin California, to allow adverse 
comment on a defendant’s silence even if the defendant remained silent to avoid 
impeachment with prior convictions. While some states might choose to implement the 
statutory protections Sampsell-Jones supports, others undoubtedly would not. Cf. Bellin, 
supra note 9, at 888 (advocating that Griffin be “limited to the circumstances” present in 
Griffin and Carter “where numerous tactical considerations unknown to juries (primarily, 
impeachment with prior convictions) invalidated any otherwise natural inference that a 
defendant’s refusal to testify indicated consciousness of guilt”). 
144 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965). 
145 Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 60–61 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) 
(noting that “[s]ensible and justminded men, in important affairs of life, deem it 
significant that a man remains silent when confronted with serious and responsible 
evidence against himself which it is within his power to contradict” and criticizing the 
idea that the constitution does not “allow jurors to do that which sensible and rightminded 
men do every day”). 
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Moving next to the Fifth Amendment grounding of the prohibition, it 
also appears that the courts are invoking a Fifth Amendment prohibition 
against adverse comment to protect some refusals to testify that do not sound 
in the Fifth Amendment. In fact, courts generally fail to engage in any 
rigorous Fifth Amendment analysis when the subject of that analysis is the 
defendant in a criminal trial. 
The next section further analyzes the deficiencies of the existing blanket 
prohibition of adverse comment by exploring the various motives for 
defendants to remain silent at trial. As this exploration reveals, while 
defendants’ motives vary widely and may even overlap, only a discrete 
subset of motivations for remaining silent at trial trigger protection from 
adverse inferences under a Fifth Amendment (unfair) penalty rationale. 
A. Defendants for Whom an Unfair Penalty Rationale Justifies a 
 Prohibition of Adverse Comment
A significant portion of criminal defendants, typified by the defendants 
in Griffin and Carter, fall comfortably within the unfair penalty rationale for 
a prohibition of adverse comment posited in Part III, supra. As discussed 
below, this group consists of two types of defendants: (1) those who will be 
impeached with prior convictions should they testify; and (2) those who fear 
implicating themselves in an uncharged crime. 
1. Defendants Who Do Not Testify to Avoid Revealing Their Prior 
Convictions
Procedurally, a defendant with a criminal record who desires to testify 
will seek a pretrial ruling precluding the introduction of his criminal record 
as impeachment.146 The prosecution generally opposes the request.147 If the 
146 See FED. R. EVID. 609 (setting forth balancing test that permits exclusion of prior 
convictions in federal criminal trials); Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984) 
(recognizing, in context of defense efforts to exclude prior convictions, that “[a]lthough 
the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice 
has developed pursuant to the district court’s inherent authority to manage the course of 
trials”). Prosecutors too may strike first, by seeking a preliminary ruling that a 
defendant’s prior convictions are admissible should the defendant testify. 
147 See 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42, at 198 (Kenneth S. Broun et al. eds., 6th 
ed. 2006) (noting that “[m]ost prosecutors argue” that impeachment should be permitted 
because “it is misleading to permit the accused to appear as a witness of blameless life”); 
Friedman, supra note 19, at 639 (recognizing that “prosecutors offer [prior conviction 
impeachment] evidence very frequently, and both sides recognize its potency and often 
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pretrial request is denied, the defendant often declines to testify.148 It will be 
obvious in such cases that the primary motivation for the defendant’s silence 
litigate its admissibility with great vigor”); Mason Ladd, Credibility Tests—Current 
Trends, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 166, 190 (1940) (asserting that potential to introduce 
defendant’s criminal record as impeachment “is something never missed by the 
prosecuting attorney”). 
148 See Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: 
The Effect of a Prior Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353, 1357 (2009) (finding a statistically significant association 
“between the existence of a criminal record and the decision to testify at trial”); Gordon 
Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 403, 482 (1992) (citing empirical evidence that “a defendant [i]s almost three times 
more likely to refuse to testify if he ha[s] a criminal record than if not”); cf. John H. 
Blume, The Dilemma of the Criminal Defendant with a Prior Record–Lessons from the 
Wrongfully Convicted, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 477, 489–90 (2008) (analyzing data 
regarding defendants cleared by post-conviction DNA testing and determining that 39% 
of apparently innocent defendants did not testify and 91% of those who did not testify 
had prior convictions). 
Eisenberg and Hans report that only 52% of defendants with a “criminal record” 
who testified in the jurisdictions studied were impeached with that record and conclude 
that this “suggest[s] that judges, as evidentiary rules require, balance the relevance of a 
prior criminal record with the possible prejudice to the defendant.” Eisenberg & Hans, 
supra, at 1373. This conclusion may be incorrect, however, as it is almost completely 
inapplicable for two of the four jurisdictions studied. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28, 
subdiv. (f) (“Any prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal 
proceeding . . . shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of 
impeachment . . . .”); D.C. CODE § 14-305 (b)(1) (LexisNexis 2008) (mandating 
admission of any felony conviction offered as impeachment without any balancing); see 
also People v. Hinton 126 P.3d 981, 1018 (Cal. 2006) (recognizing narrow discretion 
despite constitutional provision for trial courts to exclude impeachment due to 
“substantial danger of undue prejudice” as per generic evidentiary rules); cf. Bellin, supra
note 138, at 324–35 (documenting state and federal courts’ doctrinal shift toward 
permitting impeachment with virtually any felony conviction); Blume, supra, at 490 
(reporting in a recent study that “[i]n every single case in which a defendant with a prior 
record testified, the trial court permitted the prosecution to impeach the defendant with 
his or her prior convictions”). It is possible that the high percentage of defendants who 
testified free of impeachment in the Eisenberg and Hans study is an artifact of a data set 
that did not specifically define “criminal record.” See Eisenberg & Hans, supra, at 1389 
(acknowledging that “we had information only about the presence of a defendant’s 
criminal record, not its type”). All or most of the instances where a testifying defendant 
was not impeached may be explained by the fact that the defendant’s “criminal record” 
consisted entirely of non-impeachable offenses, such as misdemeanor offenses. Blume, 
supra, at 490 n.50 (critiquing same finding on the ground that the data used in the 
Eisenberg and Hans study “did not permit a determination of whether the prior conviction 
could have been used for impeachment purposes”). 
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is the existence of the prior convictions. This explanation, however, cannot 
be made known to the jury without incriminating the defendant and thus 
short circuiting the defendant’s effort to avoid self-incrimination. 
In the circumstances just described, the unfair-penalty rationale applies 
with full force. An adverse inference of guilt from silence is an unfair and 
particularly severe penalty for the defendant’s trial silence because, 
unbeknownst to the jury, the inference endorsed by the prosecutor and 
condoned by the court is belied by the actual reason for the defendant’s 
refusal to testify. Further, it is a penalty that sounds in the Fifth Amendment. 
The defendant declines to testify because he fears that testimony 
acknowledging his criminal record will incriminate him in the eyes of the 
jury. In short, the defendant remains silent and in so doing suffers a penalty 
roughly analogous to compulsion in order to avoid testifying against 
himself.149
149 An innocent defendant who declines to testify to avoid revealing his prior record 
is by no means acting irrationally. See Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal 
Procedure and Constitutional Law: Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again, 74 N.C. L.
REV. 1559, 1632 (1996) (“The principal reason why defendants refuse to take the stand is 
that they fear impeachment with prior convictions—a fear with strong support from the 
empirical evidence.”); Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 148, at 1357 (concluding after 
empirical analysis that juries appear to rely on a defendant’s criminal record, introduced 
as impeachment, to convict in cases where the evidence is otherwise weak and that “[t]he 
effect in otherwise weak cases is substantial and can increase the probability of 
conviction to over 50% when the probability of conviction in similar cases without 
criminal records is less than 20%”). This is one of the key problems with Seidmann and 
Stein’s dismissal of prior conviction impeachment as a potential justification for the 
Griffin rule. See Seidmann & Stein, supra note 12. Seidmann and Stein appear to assume 
away the problem, arguing: 
In a rational world, in which jurors properly determine the reasonable level of doubt, 
innocents with prior criminal records do not require Griffin protection. Imagine that 
a significant proportion of innocents do not testify because they fear impeachment 
by prior convictions. If the jury is aware of their motives for not testifying, then it 
would also not draw adverse inferences in the absence of Griffin.
Id. at 494–95. But see sources cited infra note 153 (noting widespread criticism of 
suggestion that juries can disregard evidence of prior convictions in assessing factual 
guilt and citing juror studies supporting the criticisms); Bellin, supra note 138, at 300–01 
& nn.39–40 (explaining that “empirical studies and common sense suggest that a limiting 
instruction offers little protection against the prejudice inherent in prior conviction 
impeachment” and that “[t]his sentiment is reflected in the sheer number of defendants 
who simply refrain from testifying rather than rely on the instruction”). 
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One might object that because the jury will be instructed not to consider 
a defendant’s prior crimes as substantive evidence (only as impeachment), a 
fear of revealing prior crimes is not a valid basis for invoking the 
privilege.150 Under the case law, the Fifth Amendment’s bar to compulsory 
self-incrimination protects a person only from furnishing evidence that 
provides a “link in the chain of evidence” necessary to convict him of a 
crime—i.e., substantive evidence of guilt.151 The admission of a defendant’s 
prior criminal record, however, occupies something of a hybrid place in the 
evidentiary realm, residing somewhere between impeachment and 
substantive evidence.152 Its admission is widely recognized as extremely 
damaging not just as impeachment but also as substantive propensity 
evidence.153 Consequently, a desire to preclude admission of a criminal 
150 A typical instruction reads: “Th[e] [defendant’s] earlier conviction was brought 
to your attention only as one way of helping you decide how believable his testimony 
was. You cannot use it for any other purpose. It is not evidence that he is guilty of the 
crime that he is on trial for now.” KEVIN F. O’MALLEY, JAY E. GRENIG & WILLIAM C.
LEE, 1A FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 15.08, at 427 (6th ed. 2007) (listing 
this instruction from the Sixth Circuit and providing other examples by circuit). 
151 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951). 
152 See Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 482–83 n.11 (1972) (recognizing “[t]hat a 
record of prior convictions may actually do more than simply impeach a defendant’s 
credibility”: “‘If the accused is forced to admit that he has a ‘record’ of past convictions, 
particularly if they are for crimes similar to the one on trial, the danger is obvious that the 
jury, despite instructions, will give more heed to the past convictions as evidence that the 
accused is the kind of man who would commit the crime on charge, or even that he ought 
to be put away without too much concern with present guilt, than they will to its 
legitimate bearing on credibility.’” (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 43, at 93 (1st 
ed. 1954))); Bellin, supra note 138, at 300–03 (discussing inherent overlap in permissible 
inference of lack of credibility from prior conviction and prohibited inference of 
substantive guilt from prior conviction). 
153 See James Beaver & Steven Marques, A Proposal to Modify the Rule on 
Criminal Conviction Impeachment, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 585, 602, 607 (1985) (arguing that 
despite limiting instruction, “[f]ew academicians believe . . . that jurors consider past 
crimes solely for impeachment purposes and not as proof of the defendant’s likelihood of 
having committed the charged offense” and reporting empirical data that suggest that 
juries do not, in fact, follow instruction); Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong with 
Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A Look at How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction 
Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 31, 32 (1999) (reporting results of juror studies revealing 
that “jurors do use prior conviction evidence to infer criminal propensity and frequently 
ignore or fail to understand limiting instructions”); Eisenberg & Hans, supra note 148, at 
1358–61 (surveying mock juror studies and concluding that “[m]ost of the experimental 
studies show that knowledge of a defendant’s criminal record has statistically significant 
biasing effects on jurors’ guilt perceptions and verdicts” and that “experimental research 
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record should satisfy the requirement that “the witness has reasonable cause 
to apprehend danger from a direct answer.”154 As the Supreme Court has 
stated: “To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the 
implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a 
responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be 
answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result.”155
2. Defendants Who Fear Revealing Complicity in Uncharged Crimes
A second scenario that satisfies the prerequisites for a Fifth Amendment-
based prohibition of adverse comment arises when defendants decline to 
testify to avoid incriminating themselves in an offense other than the offense 
charged. For example, a defendant may have sold drugs to a victim who was 
later assaulted. If the defendant were to testify, he might convince the jury to 
acquit him on the assault charge, but at the same time incriminate himself in 
the drug sale.156
A defendant who remains silent in this circumstance is faced with an 
adverse inference (that he is refusing to testify because he cannot rebut the 
prosecution’s evidence of the charged crime) that is unusually severe because 
it is contrary to fact. The inference is also unfair in that it is effectively 
unrebuttable so long as the defendant maintains his Fifth Amendment right 
against self incrimination. The defendant cannot rebut the adverse inference 
without incriminating himself (by revealing the uncharged criminal conduct). 
also suggests that limiting instructions are not a reliable method for eliminating the 
negative impact of criminal records”); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Prior Crime Impeachment of 
Criminal Defendants: A Constitutional Analysis of Rule 609, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 391, 403 
(1980) (“Practicing attorneys almost universally concede that the limiting instruction fails 
to achieve its goal.”); see also Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949) 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome 
by instructions to the jury . . . all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction.” 
(citations omitted)). 
154 Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 487. 
155 Id. at 486–87. A defendant might also decline to testify to avoid a sentence 
enhancement for perceived perjury. See Bellin, supra note 9, at 877–80. A clear analogue 
to this circumstance has been held not to violate the privilege. See United States v. 
Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 131 (1980) (holding that witness cannot claim privilege based 
on fear that testimony will later be used in prosecution for perjury). 
156 The fact that the defendant was not currently charged with the drug sale is 
irrelevant. The privilege applies in any proceeding, whether civil or criminal, “where the 
answers might incriminate [the speaker] in future criminal proceedings.” See Lefkowitz 
v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). 
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For this defendant, adverse comment can be characterized as a penalty akin 
to compulsion that sounds in the Fifth Amendment privilege and therefore 
must be prohibited.157
B. Defendants for Whom an Unfair Penalty Rationale Cannot Justify a 
 Prohibition of Adverse Comment
The defendants discussed in the previous section fall comfortably within 
an unfair-penalty rationale and should, therefore, be shielded from adverse 
comment by the Fifth Amendment. The contrary is true for all other silent 
defendants. For the balance of silent defendants, either the absence of 
unfairness renders the penalty imposed by adverse comment insufficiently 
severe to constitute compulsion, or the defendant’s motive for remaining 
silent does not sound in the Fifth Amendment. In these circumstances, there 
is no Fifth Amendment basis for prohibiting an adverse inference and, absent 
a statutory prohibition, the prosecution must be permitted to comment on the 
defendant’s silence.158
1. Defendants Who Do Not Testify Because Their Testimony Will 
Support the Prosecution Case
Perhaps the most common reason a defendant does not testify is that he 
perceives that the substance of his testimony will harm rather than help his 
defense.159 Either the defendant is guilty and unable or unwilling to articulate 
any convincing alternative explanation for the prosecution’s evidence, or he 
is innocent and suspects his exculpatory explanation will be disbelieved.160
157 A prosecutor, disbelieving or discounting the defendant’s claim of involvement 
in an uncharged offense (particularly a relatively minor one), could attempt to remove the 
Fifth Amendment protection by providing “use and derivative-use immunity” for the 
uncharged offense. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 459 (1972). 
158 Cf. People v. Lopez, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 657 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (“[W]here a 
witness has no constitutional or statutory right to refuse to testify, a different analysis 
applies. Jurors are entitled to draw a negative inference when such a witness refuses to 
provide relevant testimony.”). 
159 Tague, supra note 38, at 19 (“Of those defendants who do not testify, the bulk 
remain silent, one suspects, because they would condemn themselves by testifying 
truthfully.”). 
160 In either circumstance, the testimony will likely reduce the chances for acquittal. 
See United States v. Clark, 45 F.3d 1247, 1251 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[A]dverse inferences 
will inevitably be drawn from disbelief of a defendant’s trial testimony . . . .”); James L. 
Kainen, The Impeachment Exception to the Exclusionary Rules: Policies, Principles, and 
2010] ADVERSE COMMENT 275 
For these defendants, the import of trial silence strongly correlates with 
the adverse inference formerly permitted under California law: the 
defendant’s failure to testify tends “to indicate the truth of [the prosecution’s] 
evidence” as to “any evidence or facts . . . which the defendant can 
reasonably be expected to deny or explain because of facts within his 
knowledge.”161 Absent bizarre circumstances (e.g., amnesia), the defendant 
knows more about his guilt or innocence than any other witness and has 
himself concluded that if the jury hears his testimony, the jurors are more 
likely to credit the prosecution’s case.162 An inference paralleling this 
sentiment is neither unfair nor unwarranted.163 It is, in the parlance of 
Griffin, natural and irresistible.164
This is not to say that the defendant who remains silent to avoid 
testifying to facts that support the prosecution (or to facts that are so 
unbelievable as to have the same effect) is not penalized by adverse 
comment. He assuredly is. It is also clear that this penalty sounds in the Fifth 
Amendment as the defendant is silent to avoid becoming a witness against 
himself. Nevertheless, the defendant is not penalized unfairly. An adverse 
inference from silence follows from the defendant’s own implicit 
acknowledgement that his testimony will strengthen rather than rebut the 
prosecution evidence. In addition, the defendant suffers a virtually identical 
penalty simply by refusing to testify, due to the likelihood that the jury will 
view the refusal as evidence of guilt.165 As explained in Part II.C, supra,
Politics, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1301, 1354–55 (1992) (contending that “[a]ny suggestion of 
perjury in any fashion connected to the defense is powerful affirmative proof” and noting 
that “[c]lassic jury instructions” invite the factfinder to use perjury, falsification of 
evidence and the like as evidence of consciousness of guilt, i.e., affirmative evidence of 
guilt). 
161 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 610 (1965). 
162 Cf. Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1909, 1936–37 & n.101 (1992) (recognizing defendant’s information advantage in 
plea bargaining context: “D [the defendant] has a major piece of information that P [the 
prosecutor] does not: D knows whether or not he is guilty”). 
163 Cf. Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 67–68 (2000) (holding that prosecutor may 
comment on a defendant’s ability to tailor testimony to that of other witnesses and 
explaining that a contrary principle “differs from what we adopted in Griffin in one or the 
other of the following respects: It either prohibits inviting the jury to do what the jury is 
perfectly entitled to do; or it requires the jury to do what is practically impossible”). 
164 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614. 
165 Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 301 (1981) (noting that the 
“penalty . . . exacted . . . by adverse comment on the defendant’s silence” may “be just as 
severe when there is no adverse comment, but when the jury is left to roam at large with 
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comment on that inference, while marginally increasing its sting, is only a 
mild and incremental penalty.166 Consequently, for this category of 
defendants, adverse comment cannot be deemed such a severe penalty that it 
rivals the compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment. 
2. Defendants Who Decline to Testify to Hide Their Demeanor
Jurists and commentators arguing in support of the constitutional 
prohibition of adverse comment often invoke a subset of hypothetical 
defendants who decline to testify due to poor oral presentation skills, 
excessive nervousness or anxiety—traits that a jury could mistakenly equate 
with either consciousness of guilt or general criminality.167 While the 
existence of such defendants might support a statutory prohibition of adverse 
comment, it does not warrant a constitutional prohibition. Adverse comment 
on a refusal to testify that is occasioned by disinclination to disclose one’s 
own “unappealing countenance,”168 does not give rise to either significant 
unfairness, or Fifth Amendment protection. 
First, the requisite unfairness is minimized because the adverse inference 
can be rebutted. Where applicable, defense counsel can respond to any 
comment on a defendant’s silence through evidence and argument regarding 
the defendant’s lack of formal education, below average intelligence, poor 
public speaking skills, mental disorders and the like that might explain the 
defendant’s silence despite his professed innocence. (To the extent the 
prosecutor wants to avoid such argument and evidence, she may abstain from 
adverse comment.) If requested, a jury instruction would be in order, 
repeating the eloquent language of Justice Field (“It is not every one who can 
safely venture on the witness stand, though entirely innocent of the charge 
only its untutored instincts to guide it, to draw from the defendant’s silence broad 
inferences of guilt”). 
166 See supra Part II.C. 
167 See, e.g., Griffin, 380 U.S. at 613; Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 330 (arguing that 
some innocent defendants may be better off not testifying because, inter alia, they “may 
look sleazy” have a “vague memory” of events or be “inarticulate, nervous or easily 
intimidated”). 
168 Portuondo, 529 U.S. at 85 (Ginsburg, with Souter, JJ., dissenting) (positing, as 
potential explanation for “why an innocent defendant might not want to testify” that “he 
has an unappealing countenance”); see Tague, supra note 38, at 19 (“The Court’s image 
of a befuddled, cowering defendant seems quaint . . . and unconvincing.”). 
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against him . . . .”).169 The competing explanations for the defendant’s 
silence, and an instruction endorsing those possible explanations, can be 
placed before the jurors who would then decide whether the circumstances 
warrant an adverse inference.170 This is, after all, how the criminal trial 
system usually treats disputed inferences—providing the jury with the 
evidence and arguments on both sides of the question and leaving the 
ultimate significance of the respective showings to the jurors.171
Second, a refusal to testify that is based on a witness’s fear that his 
demeanor will incriminate him finds little support in Fifth Amendment 
doctrine. The Fifth Amendment prohibits compelling a person to be a 
“witness” against oneself. Construing the term “witness,” the Supreme Court 
has interpreted the privilege to protect “an accused only from being 
compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with 
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature . . . .”172 “[I]n order to be 
169 Wilson, 149 U.S. at 66; see also Griffin, 380 U.S. at 623 n.10 (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) (noting the possibility that a defendant could request an instruction “which 
would have brought out other possible reasons which might have influenced the 
defendant’s decision not to become a witness”). 
170 A similar battle of inferences would be created where the defendant purports to 
have tactically elected to remain silent based on the perceived weakness of the 
prosecution’s case in chief.  
171 Sampsell-Jones, supra note 9, at 1353 (arguing for abolition of Griffin and 
noting that, as with other inferences, “[t]he strength of the opposing arguments” 
regarding an inference of guilt from silence “will vary depending on the circumstances of 
the case, and the jury can decide which is more persuasive”). For example, the courts 
permit the prosecution to introduce evidence of a defendant’s flight following a crime 
even though there are often innocent explanations for flight. See Allen v. United States, 
164 U.S. 492, 499 (1896) (“[T]he law is entirely well settled that the flight of the accused 
is competent evidence against him as having a tendency to establish his guilt.”); United 
States v. Zanghi, 189 F.3d 71, 83 (1st Cir. 1999) (“Evidence of an accused’s flight may 
be admitted at trial as indicative of a guilty mind, so long as there is an adequate factual 
predicate for the inference that the defendant’s movement was indicative of a guilty 
conscience, and not normal travel.”); Snyder, supra note 9, at 298–99 (recognizing that 
suggestion that inference from silence is impermissible because ambiguous is 
inconsistent with permitting inferences to be drawn in other ambiguous contexts, such as 
with flight); see also Hunter, supra note 11, at 301 (noting same analogy to flight as well 
as inference from other “suspicious activities”).  
172 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966); see also
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990) (quoting same); Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment does not independently 
proscribe the compelled production of every sort of incriminating evidence but applies 
only when the accused is compelled to make a testimonial communication that is 
incriminating.”). 
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testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, 
relate a factual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a person 
compelled to be a ‘witness’ against himself.”173
The Supreme Court applied this limitation on the term “witness” in 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, where it concluded that the prosecutor, in a drunk-
driving prosecution, could introduce a videotape showing the defendant’s 
slurred speech in response to police questioning, despite the absence of 
required Miranda warnings. The Court explained: “The physical inability to 
articulate words in a clear manner due to ‘the lack of muscular coordination 
of his tongue and mouth,’ is not itself a testimonial component of [the 
defendant’s] responses to [the police officer’s] introductory questions.”174
Such non-testimonial components of speech are not protected by the Fifth 
Amendment.175
The same reasoning should apply to a defendant’s demeanor during trial 
testimony; compulsion to reveal one’s rough or anxious demeanor, odd 
inflections or reliance on colloquialisms, is not prohibited by the Fifth 
Amendment.176 Consequently, even if adverse comment is deemed to 
173 Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 210, 218–19 (1988) (holding that 
government could compel criminal defendant to sign “consent directive” authorizing 
bank to disclose information relating to certain bank accounts because directive “is not 
testimonial in nature”); see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 589 (1990) 
(quoting same). 
174 Muniz, 496 U.S. at 590–91 (citation omitted); see id. at 592 (“Under Schmerber
and its progeny, we agree . . . that any slurring of speech and other evidence of lack of 
muscular coordination revealed by Muniz’s responses to Officer Hosterman’s direct 
questions constitute nontestimonial components of those responses.”). 
175 Id. at 590–92. In United States v. Velarde-Gomez, the Ninth Circuit cited Muniz
for proposition that “‘physical’ and ‘demeanor’ evidence” are distinct from “‘testimonial’ 
evidence” and that “evidence of the former does not engender Fifth Amendment 
protection. Demeanor evidence often involves the admission of evidence concerning a 
defendant’s ‘slurr[ed] speech,’ . . . ‘apparent nervousness,’ . . . or a defendant’s demeanor 
during a polygraph test, even though the results may not be admissible.” 269 F.3d 1023, 
1030–31 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). 
176 In Muniz, the Court also held that the defendant’s inability to state his birthday 
did constitute a testimonial response because incrimination followed “not just because of 
his delivery, but also because of his answer’s content.” Muniz, 496 U.S. at 592. The 
Court reached this conclusion by stating that the defendant, upon being asked the 
question, faced the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt. Id. at 596–97 
(concluding that a “suspect is ‘compelled . . . to be a witness against himself’ at least 
whenever he must face the modern-day analog of the historic trilemma—either during a 
criminal trial where a sworn witness faces the identical three choices, or during custodial 
interrogation”). In the instant scenario, the defendant is not faced with the cruel trilemma 
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pressure a defendant to reveal an unappealing demeanor, that pressure does 
not implicate the Fifth Amendment. 
3. Defendants Who Do Not Testify to Avoid Implicating a Third Party 
or Embarrassing Themselves
The Supreme Court has highlighted another type of defendant properly, 
in the Court’s view, protected by the Griffin rule: defendants who, despite an 
ability to demonstrate their innocence, are unwilling to testify because they 
“prefer to risk a finding of guilt rather than being required to incriminate 
others whom they either love or fear.”177 With respect to these defendants, 
there is arguably the requisite unfairness for a finding of compulsion in that if 
adverse comment is permitted, a counterfactual and unrebuttable inference 
will be urged upon the jury as a consequence of their silence. Nevertheless, 
constitutional protection from adverse inferences is not warranted because no 
Fifth Amendment right is implicated.178
The Fifth Amendment protects a defendant from being forced to be a 
witness “against himself.”179 There is no right to decline to incriminate a
third party and a person can be compelled to do so.180 It necessarily follows 
that if a defendant can be compelled to incriminate a third party, comment 
because his answers themselves (unlike the answer in Muniz) do not constitute self-
accusation. It is only the “delivery” of those answers that he believes will incriminate 
him. Id. at 592. In any event, to the extent difficult questions arise as to whether a certain 
form of demeanor is sufficiently substantive to be testimonial, these questions need not 
be resolved. Whether a refusal to testify is based on demeanor or the negative impact of 
substantive testimony, it is not protected under the unfair-penalty rationale set forth in 
this article. 
177 Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 344 n.2 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 300 n.15 (1981) (emphasizing among the “many 
reasons unrelated to guilt or innocence for declining to testify” a hypothetical defendant’s 
“reluctance to ‘incriminate others whom [defendants] either love or fear’” and citing 
Justice Stevens’s dissent in Lakeside). 
178 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 (1971) (“Although a defendant may 
have a right, even of constitutional dimensions, to follow whichever course he chooses, 
the Constitution does not by that token always forbid requiring him to choose.”). 
179 U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 560 
n.7 (1980) (“A witness may not employ the privilege to avoid giving testimony that he 
simply would prefer not to give.”). 
180 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896) (explaining that the “object” of the 
Fifth Amendment is “to protect the witness himself and no one else”); Schulhofer, supra
note 6, at 315 (“Obviously the privilege does not permit a witness to withhold testimony 
that might incriminate others.”). 
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that merely pressures him to do so (or penalizes him for failing to do so) 
cannot be prohibited. 
Similar analysis applies to a defendant who, while able to rebut the 
prosecution’s evidence, declines to testify to avoid disclosing information 
that will “‘disgrace him or bring him into disrepute.’”181 For example, an 
innocent defendant might decline to testify in a murder prosecution to 
conceal an affair with the victim. The defendant is clearly placed in a 
difficult position, but this circumstance does not invoke the protections of the 
Fifth Amendment; the Fifth Amendment “protects against ‘compelled self-
incrimination, not (the disclosure of) private information.’”182
In sum, adverse comment may pressure an embarrassed, loyal or fearful 
defendant to reveal information he would prefer to keep secret, but this 
pressure has no constitutional dimension. “Unless his silence is protected by 
the privilege against self-incrimination . . . the criminal defendant no less 
than any other citizen is obliged to assist the authorities.”183
181 United States v. Gecas, 120 F.3d 1419, 1428 (11th Cir. 1997); see Portuondo v. 
Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 85 (2000) (Ginsburg, with Souter, JJ., dissenting) (positing, as 
potential explanation for “why an innocent defendant might not want to testify” that “he 
worries that cross-examination will drag into public view prior conduct that, though not 
unlawful, is deeply embarrassing”). 
182 Gecas, 120 F.3d at 1428 (“The [self-incrimination] Clause does not protect a 
witness against the disclosure of facts which might ‘disgrace him or bring him into 
disrepute.’” (quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 598 (1896))); see Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976) (explaining that the Fifth Amendment is not “a general 
protector of privacy,” but rather “protects against ‘compelled self-incrimination, not (the 
disclosure of) private information’”); Schulhofer, supra note 6, at 313 (“[T]he general 
rule is that the government can legitimately compel witnesses to say what they know, 
subject only to narrowly limited privileges and exceptions.”); cf. In re Cont’l Ill. Secs. 
Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1315 (7th Cir. 1984) (“[T]here is no general privilege, analogous to 
the fifth amendment’s protection against self-incrimination, that protects against 
disclosure of information that may lead to civil liability.”). 
It is possible that a defendant could decline to testify to reveal some non-criminal but 
nonetheless prejudicial information that could be deemed analogous to the admission of a 
prior crime. Arguably, this circumstance would activate the concerns elicited in 
Part IV.A.1, supra, discussing defendants who do not testify to avoid revealing a criminal 
record. 
183 Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 558 (1980); cf. Minnesota v. Murphy, 
465 U.S. 420, 427 (1984) (recognizing that probationer asked questions that might 
incriminate him “was in no better position than the ordinary witness at a trial or before a 
grand jury who is subpoenaed, sworn to tell the truth, and obligated to answer on the pain 
of contempt, unless he invokes the privilege and shows that he faces a realistic threat of 
self-incrimination”). 
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C. Can Courts Distinguish Various Types of Defendants?
The discussion in the preceding sections suggests that a Fifth 
Amendment penalty rationale for prohibiting adverse comment properly 
applies only to a distinct subset of defendants who decline to testify. For this 
subset of defendants, Griffin’s constitutional prohibition of adverse comment 
survives doctrinal scrutiny and can be applied without objection. For all other 
defendants, however, a Fifth Amendment penalty rationale provides little 
support for a prohibition of adverse comment. These defendants receive a 
constitutional windfall when adverse comment is precluded. Depending on 
the defendant’s reasons for declining to testify in a particular case, courts are: 
(i) applying a constitutional doctrine justified (if at all) by concerns about 
fairness to prohibit comment that is perfectly fair; or (ii) protecting refusals 
to testify that are simply not cognizable under the Fifth Amendment. 
One potential defense of the existing blanket prohibition of adverse 
comment is that the courts are, as a practical matter, simply incapable of 
distinguishing among defendants’ motivations for silence. A blanket 
prohibition could thus be justified as a Miranda-like prophylactic rule, 
providing necessary “breathing space” to an otherwise vulnerable 
constitutional right.184
The problem with the breathing space justification is twofold. First, the 
justification has not been offered by the courts. It would be scandalous 
(doctrinally speaking) if a jurisprudence that “has become an essential 
feature of our legal tradition”185 has persisted for over forty years based upon 
complete artifice. If the prohibition of adverse comment extends to all 
defendants, rather than some discrete minority for whom its protections are 
intended, solely for reasons of practicality, the Court should reveal this 
unfortunate reality. The prohibition may, like Miranda warnings, come to be 
accepted as a prophylactic rule, but it cannot be smuggled into the 
constitutional firmament in bad faith. 
Second, the task of focusing the prohibition’s protections on only those 
defendants to whom it should apply is hardly insurmountable.186 Just as the 
trial court must make a threshold determination of admissibility with respect 
184 Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress “Overrule” Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV.
883, 944 (2000) (“The privilege against self-incrimination, along with other 
constitutional guarantees, needs ‘breathing space.’”). 
185 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999). 
186 Tague, supra note 38, at 20 n.87 (suggesting that “[w]e might . . . require the 
defendant to explain why he chose not to testify, as a condition of barring judicial 
comment. In this way we would consider each defendant, not defendants as a class”). 
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to other controversial inferences (e.g., an inference of guilt from flight),187 it 
can do so in the context of an inference of guilt from silence.188
For purposes of this analysis, the inference from silence is helpfully 
characterized per Griffin as “in substance a rule of evidence that allows the 
State the privilege of tendering to the jury for its consideration the failure of 
the accused to testify.”189 The prosecution, as the proponent of the inference, 
should be tasked with making an initial showing that the defendant’s silence 
is probative of guilt. This showing can be made, in line with California’s pre-
Griffin rule, by demonstrating that the defendant would be expected to 
respond to the prosecution’s evidence, if able. Substantial evidence that the 
defendant was present for the crime or came into possession of its proceeds 
or implements would carry this burden.190
Once the prosecution has carried its burden, the defense (if it sought to 
prohibit the inference) would have a burden of showing that the defendant’s 
silence is not, in fact, supportive of the veracity of the prosecution’s case. To 
do so, the defense must present an alternative explanation for the defendant’s 
silence—i.e., an explanation as to why the defendant, despite an ability to 
rebut the prosecution case, declines to do so. This showing would consist of 
two parts: (i) a rough proffer of the potentially exculpatory testimony the 
defendant would like to offer; and (ii) the identification of a motivation for 
the defendant’s silence that is cognizable under the Fifth Amendment. If a 
187 See, e.g., United States v. Atchley, 474 F.3d 840, 853 (6th Cir. 2007) (setting 
forth “four-step analysis” governing district court’s determination of whether evidence of 
flight is admissible); United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1049 (5th Cir. 1977) (same). 
188 Bradley & Hoffman, supra note 19, at 1281, 1286 (sketching out numerous 
potential reforms of the criminal justice system “as starting points for discussion” and 
suggesting that if prior conviction impeachment were abolished, the prosecutor should be 
able to comment adversely on the defendants’ refusal to testify “unless the defendant 
were able to satisfy the court that such silence was justified by some exceptional 
circumstance”); Sampsell-Jones, supra note 9, at 1357 (arguing that under a statutory 
regime, adverse comment should be prohibited in certain cases and “a judge should 
address the matter efficiently, before or during trial”); cf. Bellin, supra note 9, at 890–96 
(proposing in limine procedure designed to allow trial courts to alter default rules so that 
defendants would be more likely to testify in particular cases). 
189 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613 (1965). 
190 This is consistent with R. Kent Greenawalt’s observation on moral grounds that 
“the right to make inquiry of suspects is strongest when substantial independent evidence 
of guilt exists.” Greenawalt, supra note 9, at 59; see also Barnes v. United States, 412 
U.S. 837, 844 n.8 (1973) (emphasizing trial court’s “discretion in determining whether 
there is sufficient evidence to go to the jury and in charging the jury” in upholding 
instruction that the jury could draw an adverse inference from the unexplained possession 
of stolen checks). 
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defendant can make this showing, the trial court could preclude an adverse 
inference (and any adverse comment inviting such an inference) under the 
Fifth Amendment penalty rationale discussed in Part III, supra.
For the defense, the primary means of carrying its burden will be to 
demonstrate the existence of prejudicial prior convictions admissible only as 
impeachment. If the trial court deems the convictions inadmissible as 
impeachment or, alternately, admissible as substantive evidence (e.g., under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)),191 the showing would be neutralized. (In a 
number of states, prior conviction impeachment is either not permitted or 
severely limited.)192 Similarly, the prosecutor may stipulate to excluding the 
impeachment so as to preserve her ability to urge the jury to draw an adverse 
inference from the defendant’s silence. 
As discussed above, there is another explanation for silence that fits 
comfortably under the unfair penalty rationale: the fear of incriminating 
oneself in a crime other than the crime charged. Although this presumably 
rare circumstance would, when invoked, present the most difficult scenario 
for judges to unravel, it is perfectly analogous to a task already committed to 
trial courts.  
Witnesses other than defendants often invoke a Fifth Amendment 
privilege when called to testify. A defendant’s claim to be refraining from 
testifying so as to hide guilt of an uncharged crime can be analyzed in the 
same manner as any other witness’s invocation of a Fifth Amendment 
privilege. In such circumstances, 
191 Under Rule 404(b), evidence of prior criminal acts may be admissible when 
relevant for purposes other than as criminal propensity evidence, “such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake 
or accident.” FED. R. EVID. 404(b). In addition, Federal Rules 413 and 414 allow prior 
crimes of child molestation or sexual assault to be utilized as propensity evidence in child 
molestation and sexual assault cases. 
192 Montana, Kansas and Hawaii essentially prohibit prior conviction impeachment 
of criminal defendants. See MONT. R. EVID. 609; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-421 (2008); 
HAW. R. EVID. 609. Pennsylvania, Alaska and West Virginia allow such impeachment 
only with respect to a narrow category of prior crimes involving dishonesty or false 
statement. See ALASKA R. EVID. 609; W. VA. R. EVID. 609; PA. R. EVID. 609. 
Pennsylvania employs an awkward formulation, prohibiting the defendant from being 
asked about prior crimes, but allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of crimen 
falsi in its rebuttal case. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5918 (West 2000); 
Commonwealth v. Garcia, 712 A.2d 746, 748 (Pa. 1998) (emphasizing “legislative 
mandate that the defendant shall not be asked” about his prior crimes). For a concise 
summary of state evidentiary rules regarding prior conviction impeachment, see Blume, 
supra note 148, app. at 499–505. 
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a practice has developed whereby, outside the presence of the jury, the 
witness will allude in very general, circumstantial terms to the reasons why 
he feels he might be incriminated by answering a given question. The judge 
examines him only far enough to determine whether there is reasonable 
ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to 
answer. If the danger might exist, the court must uphold the 
privilege . . . .193
Thus, just as the courts have never permitted a non-defendant witness final 
say in the matter of self-incrimination, the defendant would not be able to 
simply claim that possible incrimination of an uncharged crime motivates his 
refusal to testify (and thereby avoid adverse comment). The witnesses mere 
“say-so” does “not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the 
court to say whether his silence is justified . . . and to require him to answer 
[or, as here, allow adverse comment] if ‘it clearly appears to the court that he 
is mistaken.’”194
The fact that the scenarios in which the unfair penalty rationale applies 
are few and fairly discrete will significantly assist the courts in determining 
which defendants are truly entitled to Fifth Amendment protection from 
adverse inferences. It is only when a defendant declines to testify to avoid 
impeachment with prior convictions or to conceal an uncharged crime that 
the Fifth Amendment penalty rationale properly applies.195 Further, it will be 
193 United States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1046–47 (5th Cir. 1976). 
194 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951) (citations omitted); see
Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d at 1046–47 (“The courts cannot accept Fifth Amendment 
claims at face value, because that would allow witnesses to assert the privilege where the 
risk of self-incrimination was remote or even nonexistent, thus obstructing the functions 
of the courts. The applicability of the privilege is ultimately a matter for the court to 
decide.”); cf. United States v. Apfelbaum, 445 U.S. 115, 128 (1980) (“‘The central 
standard for the privilege’s application has been whether the claimant is confronted by 
substantial and ‘real,’ and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination.’” 
(quoting Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951))).  
In addition, because the analysis is question-specific, Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 
at 1049, a trial court could conclude that the defendant has a legitimate reason to avoid 
answering certain questions, but that those questions are tangential to the issues in the 
case. The court could then require the defendant to either testify or suffer an adverse 
inference with the understanding that no examination regarding the potentially 
incriminating topic would be permitted. 
195 To the extent the defendant candidly acknowledges that his refusal to testify 
stems from a combination of reasons, the trial court would have to analyze the relative 
weight of each of the factors, determining whether the protected reason (e.g., prior 
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difficult for defendants to falsely claim that such reasons motivate their 
desire to testify. First, as already noted, the trial court can conduct an inquiry 
into the facial plausibility of the defendant’s contention (i.e., the claim that 
he would testify in the absence of the prior conviction impeachment or 
possible incrimination). If the defendant cannot pass this hurdle, the trial 
court should allow adverse comment. Second, if a prosecutor feels that the 
defense is employing a Fifth Amendment rationale as a ruse to avoid an 
adverse inference, she can simply stipulate to excluding the complained of 
impeachment (or provide immunity for the uncharged offense). If the 
defendant still does not testify, adverse comment and a resulting adverse 
inference will not be precluded by the Fifth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION
There will likely be resistance to altering the constitutional rule 
prohibiting adverse comment on defendant silence in criminal trials, a rule 
that the Supreme Court has endorsed as “an essential feature of our legal 
tradition.”196 Nevertheless, the rule must be supported by a coherent 
doctrinal rationale to be deserving of its “essential feature” status. No such 
rationale currently exists. 
Ignoring the doctrinal shortcomings of the existing prohibition of adverse 
comment is no solution. Over the long run, the Supreme Court, with its 
shifting majorities, cannot be expected to preclude adverse comment in state 
and federal trials merely because such comment is, as many commentators 
believe, bad policy. As a practical matter, different majorities are likely to 
come to different conclusions about the policy merits of the prohibition. 
More fundamentally, judicial legitimacy suffers when a constitutional rule 
that alters the course of countless criminal trials is not supported by a 
coherent, text-based, doctrinal rationale.197
Those who object to the proposed narrowing of the constitutional 
prohibition of adverse comment should come forward with an alternative 
doctrinal justification that supports the continued broad application of the 
convictions or an uncharged crime) is, in fact, a substantial factor in the defendant’s 
decision not to testify. 
196 Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999) (“[T]here can be little doubt 
that the rule prohibiting an inference of guilt from a defendant’s rightful silence has 
become an essential feature of our legal tradition.”). 
197 See Ayer, supra note 6, at 870–71 (arguing that “[j]udicial honesty and the 
integrity of the Constitution” demand that “Griffin . . . be rejected as without basis in the 
fifth amendment”). 
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prohibition. This justification must explain how a defendant who declines to 
testify because he perceives that his testimony will support the prosecution 
case is so severely penalized by adverse comment that he is, in effect, 
compelled to testify. In addition, the justification will need to explain why a 
defendant who declines to testify for reasons that are not protected by the 
Fifth Amendment, such as a desire to protect a third party, should be 
protected by a prohibition based in that amendment. Absent a robust 
justification along these lines, the constitutional prohibition of adverse 
comment will remain in a precarious (and essentially illegitimate) position as 
“a rule in search of a reason.”198
198 Id. at 869. 
